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ENFORCING THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
IN THE TwENTy-FIRST CENTURY: 
HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT 
Clifford Rechtschaffen • 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern Clean Water Act l ("CWA") was passed in 1972 with goals 
that were both broad and ambitious. Congress called for restorin~ the 
"chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." The 
CWA sought to achieve, by 1983, water quality levels that protect fish and 
wildlife and recreational use of waters-in shorthand, make the waters fish-
able and swimmable.3 It was also intended to eliminate the discharge of 
toxic pollutants in toxic amounts and eliminate the discharge of any pollut-
ants into navigable waters by 1985.4 
At the heart of the statute is the requirement that the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA") adopt controls for industrial and municipal point 
source dischargers that reflect the best pollution control technology, consid-
ering cost and other factors, but regardless of location.5 This requirement is 
implemented through a permit system known as the National Pollutant 
Elimination Discharge System ("NPDES,,).6 The EPA estimates that there 
are approximately 60,000 facilities nationwide that have been issued indi-
vidualized wastewater NPDES permits, and another 400,000 to 550,000 that 
require stormwater discharge permits.7 
Controlling point source discharges has led to impressive improvements 
in water quality over the past thirty years, although considerable problems 
and challenges remain.8 Prominent among these is the spotty record of gov-
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. Thanks to Bill Andreen, Michelle 
Chan-Fischel, Karen Kramer, and Jim May for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, to 
Golden Gate University law student Michelle Smith for her outstanding research assistance, and to 
Professor Deborah Lynn Guber for sharing her public opinion survey data. 
I. 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1376 (2000). 
2. /d. § 1251(a). 
3. [d. § 1251(a)(2). 
4. [d. § 1251(a)(3). 
5. See id. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316-17. 
6. [d. § 1342. 
7. Email from Nikos Singelis, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Wastewater Management (Feb. 
4,2004). 
8. See William Andreen, Water Quality Today: Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 
ALA. L. REV. 537 (2004) (hereinafter Andreen, Water Quality Today) (describing significant improve-
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ernment enforcement of the CWA's permitting requirements. A nationwide 
EPA survey in 2003, for example, found that the rates of significant non-
compliance with the CW A among 6600 major facilities-those facilities 
with the largest discharges-was approximately twenty-five percent.9 At the 
same time, resources for water quality control programs, particularly at the 
state level, are scarce and creating a daunting gap between needed and 
available resources. 10 
Thirty years later, how can we strengthen enforcement of the CWA, in-
crease rates of compliance, and move closer to achieving the statute's un-
derlying objectives? This Article argues that legislators and policymakers 
looking for solutions in this resource-strapped era should harness the power 
of the public spotlight to enhance enforcement efforts. Part I describes the 
strong Congressional and public support for vigorous enforcement of the 
statute. Part II discusses how successfully the NPDES program currently is 
being implemented by the states and the EPA. The record of performance 
shows that there are numerous deficiencies in the permitting and enforce-
ment programs of many states and that rates of noncompliance by regulated 
entities are disturbingly high. Part III describes the large resource gap af-
fecting many state NPDES programs, including state enforcement and com-
pliance assistance programs. Part IV discusses various spotlighting ap-
proaches that can be used to improve enforcement programs. These include 
(1) shining an EPA spotlight on the enforcement and compliance-related 
records of regulated firms; (2) shining an EPA spotlight on the performance 
of state NPDES programs in achieving compliance among regulated firms; 
and (3) requiring that publicly-traded corporations disclose more enforce-
ment and compliance-related information to investors and the public. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR VIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT 
OFTHECWA 
Both Congress and the public have expressed strong support for vigor-
ous and effective enforcement of the CW A. When it originally enacted the 
CW A in 1972, Congress wanted a statute that would achieve results. As 
Professor Bill Andreen has carefully documented, strong enforcement was a 
central Congressional goal. Professor Andreen explains: 
A major weakness of the prior federal program lay in the area of en-
forcement. Federal efforts to exact compliance with clean water ob-
jectives had languished for years. In fact, in over twenty years of 
the program's existence, only one case against a polluter had been 
ments in water quality due to the CW A). 
9. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE INSURANCE, A 
PILOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF THE NATURAL ENFORCEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM (2003). 
10. /d. 
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prosecuted in federal court. Thoroughly disenchanted by this ex-
perience, Congress set out in 1972 to ensure vigorous enforce-
ment. 11 
For Senator Edmund Muskie, the chief Senate architect of the bill, 
"[f]eeble enforcement ... was the principal target of [his] ire.,,12 Muskie 
declared that "enforcement under the previous program had been so 
'spotty' and ineffective that polluters had been able to continue spoiling 
the streams and lakes of the nation with apparent impunity. It was time, 
therefore, 'to require ... tougher enforcement.",13 During consideration 
of the bill on the Senate floor, senator after senator "rose to call for 
tougher, more effective federal enforcement.,,14 
777 
This Congressional desire for strong enforcement is reflected in numer-
ous provisions of the statute. One, of particular note, section 309, appears to 
require the EPA to take enforcement action to remedy statutory violations, 
an unusually strong directive from Congress. 15 Professor Andreen has per-
suasively argued that Congress really did intend in this section to impose 
mandatory enforcement duties on the EPA-to go beyond "reliance solely 
upon mere words exhorting vigorous enforcement; instead, Congress acted 
to assure it.,,16 The majority of courts have not found this duty to be manda-
tory,17 but, in any event, the language about government enforcement is as 
strong as that found in any federal environmental statute. 
II. William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for Vigor· 
ous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202,203 (1987) [hereinafter 
Andreen, Exhortation]; see also id. at 204 ("Congress obviously thought that there had been too much 
talk about stringent enforcement and too little action."). 
12. William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States-State, 
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 261-62 (2003) [hereinafter 
Andreen, Evolution]. 
13. Id. 
14. Andreen, Exhortation, supra note II, at 229. 
15. As Professor Andreen notes, section 309(a) provides: 
In the event a state-issued NPDES permit is violated, the EPA either "shall" issue a notice of 
violation to the state and the polluter, or "shall" issue an administrative compliance order or 
institute suit against the polluter. If the Agency chooses the first alternative, and appropriate 
state enforcement is not forthcoming within thirty days, the EPA "shall" issue an administra-
tive compliance order or commence civil enforcement. In the event of any other relevant vio-
lation of the Act, the EPA "shall" issue a compliance order or bring a civil enforcement ac-
tion. Section 309(b), on the other hand, uses discretionary language when referring to civil 
actions and compliance orders. It provides that the EPA is "authorized" to initiate a civil ac-
tion "for any violation for which [the EPA] is authorized to issue a compliance order" under 
section 309(a). 
/d. at 208-09. 
16. Id. at 210. Professor Andreen interprets these provisions as requiring the EPA to issue adminis-
trative compliance orders for certain statutory violations, although retaining some limited discretion to 
determine whether a relevant violation has occurred, as well as discretion to select appropriate cases for 
enforcement. In his view, the EPA's duty to take enforcement actions can be enforced by citizen suits. 
Id. at 210,244-45,256. 
17. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 
F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1977); but see S.c. Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 134 (D.S.C. 
1978). Another recent decision lends support to the argument that the CW A imposes mandatory en-
forcement duties on the EPA. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that the State of Indiana had wholly failed to 
778 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 55:3:775 
When it amended the CW A in 1987, Congress strengthened the stat-
ute's enforcement provisions, granting the EPA authority to impose admin-
istrative penalties for violations and again expressing support for forceful 
and effective enforcement. A Senate report explains that this new authority 
would increase the total number of enforcement actions brought by the EPA 
by complementing a "vigorous" civil judicial enforcement program and 
providing greater deterrent value than an administrative order for relatively 
small violations. 18 Members of Congress spoke of the bill as substantially 
increasing the EPA's enforcement capabilities to ensure compliance and of 
their desire for strong enforcement by the EPA. 19 The chief Senate sponsor, 
Senator Chafee, for example, voiced his expectation that the EPA would use 
its new administrative penalty "aggressively against illegal polluters.,,2o 
Senator Mitchell, who served as the minority floor manager for the bill and 
worked closely with Senator Chafee in developing the bill,21 similarly stated 
that the intention of the conference committee members for the EPA was to 
provide for "full and aggressive enforcement.,,22 Senator Mitchell also re-
flected on the strong public support for a muscular statute, noting that "[the 
bill's] proposals are consistent with the national consensus for clean water. 
The great majority of persons responding to a recent Harris survey either 
supported the Clean Water Act or wanted it strengthened, even considering 
the costs of pollution controls.,,23 
The EPA, under President Reagan, supported the beefing up of en-
forcement. EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus testified that the 
"Clean Water Act will not work unless EPA and state enforcement efforts 
are vigorous and effective.,,24 Assistant EPA Administrator Jack Ravan told 
enforce the CW A against Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations ("CAFOs") and that, as a result, the 
EPA was required to take over enforcement of the act in Indiana under section 309(a)(2) of the statute. 
Save the Valley, Inc. v. EPA, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985 (S.D. Ind. 20(0). Section 309(a)(2) requires the 
EPA to take over CWA enforcement in a state "[w)henever on the basis of any information available to 
him, the Administrator finds that violations of permit conditions or limitations ... are so widespread that 
[they) appear to result from a failure of the State to enforce such permit condition[s)." /d. at 983. The 
EPA argued that this section creates a discretionary duty only, but the court disagreed, holding "[t)he 
legislative history of the CW A shows that Congress intended that the public be permitted to seek en-
forcement of the CW A through citizen suits when state and federal agencies fail to exercise their en-
forcement responsibility," and that the EPA's interpretation of the "finding" requirement "would allow 
the Administrator to frustrate citizen enforcement of the CW A merely by refusing to issue a finding." Id. 
at 985. 
18. S. REP. No. 99-50, at 26 (1985), reprinted in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY 
DIVISION, 99THCONG., 2 LEG. HISTORY OF WATER QUALITY AcrOF 1987, at 1447 (1988). 
19. 133 CONGo REC. H161-216 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1987) (statement of Congressman Roe), reprinted 
in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, 99TH CONG., I LEG. HISTORY OF 
WATER QUALITY AcrOF 1987, at 559 (1988). 
20. 133 CONGo REC. S733-69, 912-18, 1003-34 (daily ed. Jan 14, 20, 21, 1987) (statement of Sena-
tor Chafee), reprinted in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, 99TH CONG., I 
LEG. HISTORY OF WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, at 367 (1988). 
21. Id. at 364. 
22. Id. at 376 (statement of Senator Mitchell). 
23. 132 CONGo REC. SI6424-611 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Senator Mitchell), re-
printed in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, 99TH CONG., 2 LEG. HISTORY 
OF WATER QUALITY AcrOF 1987, at 632 (1988). 
24. Possible Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Administration Testimony at 
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Congress that the EPA wanted administrative penalty authority "as a com-
plement to our enforcement tools so that we can most efficiently and effec-
tively assure compliance with the [statute].,,25 
In the 1987 amendments, Congress also amended the criminal penalty 
provisions of the CW A. Before 1987, the statute provided for criminal pen-
alties for those who "willfully and negligently" violated the CW A. Express-
ing its intent to heighten enforcement efforts and create stiffer penalties for 
violations of CW A provisions, Congress in 1987 created two separate 
criminal sections: felony penalties for "knowing" violations and misde-
meanor penalties for "negligent" violations.z6 Both Congress and the EPA 
noted that "[s]trong public support exists for aggressive enforcement action 
in cases of environmental misconduct.,,27 Congress also demonstrated its 
support for strong citizen enforcement, providing that administrative en-
forcement actions preclude citizen enforcement only in carefully circum-
scribed circumstances.28 A Senate report explained that "[c]itizen suits are a 
proven enforcement tool. They operate ... to both spur and supplement ... 
government enforcement actions. They have deterred violators and achieved 
significant compliance gains. ,,29 
Since then, the public has also indicated its strong support for vigorous 
environmental enforcement. A 1991 survey, for example, found that by a 
78% to 18% margin, the public supports criminal sanctions for responsible 
corporate officials when companies are found guilty of deliberately violat-
ing pollution laws (the same margin supports such legal provisions for gov-
ernment officials responsible for deliberate violations).3o A 1996 survey 
found that 82% of the public believes either that current environmentallaws 
need to be made tougher (28%) or that better enforcement is needed 
House Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. of the Comm. on Pub. Works & Transp., 98th 
Congo (1983) (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA), reprinted in ENVIRONMENT 
AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, 99TH CONG., 3 LEG. HISTORY OF WATER QUALITY ACT 
OF 1987, at 2007 (1988). 
25. Amending the Clean Water Act: Hearing on S.53 and S.652 Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. 
of the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 98th Congo (1985) (statement of Jack. E. Ravan, Assistant Admin-
istrator for Water, EPA), reprinted in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, 
99TH CONG., 2 LEG. HISTORY OF WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, at 1646 (1988). 
26. United States v. Premcor Refining Group, Inc., 2001 WL 1335734, *3 (N.D. III. June 8, 2001). 
The courts have held that knowing violations do not require specific intent but that Congress sought to 
impose liability on an individual who knowingly engages in conduct that results in a permit violation, 
regardless of whether the person knew what the permit required or that his conduct was illegal. See, e.g., 
United States V. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993). 
27. S. REP. No. 99-50, at 30 (1985), reprinted in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY 
DIVISION, 99TH CONG., 2 LEG. HISTORY OF WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, at 1451 (1988); supra note 
24, at 2008 (testimony of EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus). 
28. Specifically, the statute provides that administrative penalty orders preclude citizen enforcement 
actions where the EPA or the state has issued a final order and the violator has paid a penalty assessed 
under the CWA or "such comparable state law." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). However, citizen ac-
tions filed within 120 days of the date that notice is provided are not precluded by administrative penalty 
orders.ld. § 1319(g)(6)(B)(ii). 
29. S. REP. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985), reprinted in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY 
DIVISION, 99TH CONG., 2 LEG. HISTORY OF WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, at 1449 (1988). 
30. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENT OPINION STUDY, INC. (SECOND NATIONAL 
SURVEY), PuBLIC ATTITUDES ON THE ENVIRONMENT (June 1991). 
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(54%).31 Only 15% responded to the contrary, either that the laws and en-
forcement are at the right levels (7%) or that the laws are too tough (8%).32 
These results were closely replicated in another study four years later.33 
Other recent survey results are equally pro-enforcement. Gallup polls, for 
example, found that by overwhelming margins (75% to 21 % in 2003, 77% 
to 20% in 2001), the public favors "more strongly enforcing federal envi-
ronmental regulations.,,34 
Surveys also suggest that the public supports stronger environmental 
standards, including standards affecting water pollution. In a 1996 poll, for 
example, a significant majority (73%) said that water pollution laws gener-
ally have not gone far enough.35 A Gallup poll conducted in 2000 found that 
58% of the public believed the federal government was doing "too little" to 
resolve environmental problems (only 10% said it was doing "too much,,).36 
The survey found that close to two thirds of those polled believed that "only 
some progress" had been made in dealing with environmental problems?7 A 
2001 Gallup survey found that 88% of those surveyed personally worried 
about water pollution-62% a great deal and 26% a fair amount.38 And a 
Gallup poll in 2003 found that an overwhelming majority of the public 
(80% to 19%) favors setting higher emission and pollution standards for 
business and industry. 39 
31. Belden & Russonello, The Ecology, Feb. 29-Mar. 12, 1996 (n = 2005 adults nationwide), Q37, 
available at LEXIS, News & Business Library, Public Opinion Online File, Accession No. 0286490. 
32. Id. 
33. That survey found that 81 % of the public believes either that our environmental laws are not 
strong enough and tougher laws should be enacted (25%) or that current laws are tough enough but they 
are not enforced and that they should be strictly enforced (56%). Tarrance Group & Greenberg-Quinlan 
Research, Inc., Nov. 12-19, 2000 (n = 1200 national registered voters), Q27, available at 
http://www.greenbergresearch.comlpublicationslreports/fqlcvefpollI 11200.pdf. By contrast, 16% be-
lieve either that current laws and enforcement are fine (13%) or laws and enforcement are too strict and 
should be relaxed (3%). /d. 
34. Gallup Organization, March 3-5, 2003 (n = 1003 adults nationwide), Q9, available at LEXIS 
News & Business Library, Public Opinion File, Accession No. 0428056; Gallup Organization, March 5-
7,2001 (n = 1000 adults nationwide), Q19, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library, Public Opin-
ion File, Accession No. 0380807. Another poll, conducted in 200 I after the Bush Administration an-
nounced a reorganization of the Department of Justice to focus more on terrorist threats and less on 
environmental enforcement, found that by a margin of 64% to 27%, the public opposed relaxing en-
forcement of safe drinking water and clean air laws to focus on threats like anthrax. Frank O'Donnell, In 
Apparent Rebuke to Ashcroft, Public Overwhelmingly Rejects Easing Environmental Enforcement, 
CLEAN AIR TRUST, at http://www.c1eanairtrust.orglrelease.11200l.html(Nov. 20,2(01). 
35. NAT'L ENVTL. EDUC. & TRAINING FOUND., REPORT CARD: ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES AND 
KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA 31-33 (1996) (citing Roper and Starch survey). 
36. DEBORAH LYNN GUBER, THE GRASSROOTS OF A GREEN REVOLUTION: POLLING AMERICA ON 
THE ENVIRONMENT 22 (2003). 
37. /d. at 52. 
38. Id. at 40 (quoting 2001 Gallup poll). 
39. Gallup Organization, March 3-5, 2003 (n = 1003 adults nationwide), QII, available at LEXIS, 
News & Business Library, Public Opinion Online File, Accession No. 0428058. 
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II. THE PERFORMANCE GAP IN NPDES PROGRAMS 
Thirty years after the CW A was adopted, how well is the NPDES pro-
gram working? How effective have the states and the EPA been in achiev-
ing bottom line results--compliance with permit requirements? 
Like most federal environmental statutes, the CW A operates under a 
"cooperative federalism" framework. Under this model, the federal gov-
ernment sets national standards and is ultimately responsible for ensuring 
achievement of these requirements, but states can receive authorization 
from the EPA to implement the program under the EPA's oversight. To 
obtain authorization, states must enact standards at least as stringent as fed-
eral law and demonstrate that they have adequate personnel, enforcement 
authorities, and other capacity to administer the program.40 Forty-five states 
have received full or partial authorization from the EPA to implement the 
NPDES program.41 
The record of state and EPA performance under this cooperative feder-
alism framework shows that while we have made important strides, we are 
still far from achieving the ambitious goals set by Congress. 
For example, many states and the EPA do not promptly renew and up-
date permits once they expire.42 Facilities with outdated permits may oper-
ate with weak or inadequate controls. As of September 2003, the EPA re-
ported that approximately 15% of major facilities and one third of minor 
facilities were operating with outdated permits.43 That is an improvement 
from prior years; the EPA estimated in 2002, for example, that 20% of ma-
jor facility permits had expired.44 In some states the percentage of outdated 
permits is much higher, such as Indiana (41 %), Missouri (34%), and Louisi-
ana (30%). 
Noncompliance with permit requirements also has been a longstanding 
problem, one that continues today. A 1982 General Accounting Office 
("GAO") report based on over 500 facilities, for example, found that 82% 
of these dischargers had violated their permits at least once during a two-
year period and that 24% of these polluters were in significant noncompli-
ance with CWA requirements.45 Significant noncompliance is defined for 
toxic pollutants as exceeding an average monthly limit by 20% or more in 
40. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § I 342(b); 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.22-.64 (describing authorization requirements 
for state administration of NPDES program). 
41. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NPDES STATE PROGRAM STATUS, at 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last modified Apr. 14,2003). 
42. 5 U.S.c. § 558(c) (2000). The Administrative Procedure Act allows a facility to continue operat-
ing under the terms of an expired permit if it filed a timely renewal application. [d. 
43. This figure is for minor facilities that have individual permits, not those that are covered by 
general permits. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BACKLOG STATUS REPORT FOR MINOR FACILITIES, at 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/permitissuancelbacklog.cfm (last modified Oct. 17,2003). For minor facili-
ties covered by general permits, approximately 19% of permits are outdated. [d. 
44. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BACKLOG STATUS REPORT FOR MAJORS-JANUARY 2002 (Jan. 
2002) (copy on file with author). 
45. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH EPA 
POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS 7 (1983), quoted in Andreen, Exhonation, supra note II, at 205. 
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any two months of a six-month period and for conventional pollutants as 
exceeding an average monthly limit by 40% in any two months of a six-
month period.46 A 1993 study evaluating the CWA's fIrst twenty years con-
cluded: 
[I]nadequate enforcement is [a] major problem with both the 
NPDES and pretreatment programs. Study after study has docu-
mented that dischargers, both direct and indirect, violate the law re-
peatedly and flagrantly-and get away with it nearly all the time ... 
. In addition to reported instances of noncompliance, many facilities 
fail to meet Clean Water Act requirements, masked through the fIc-
tion of their placement on "schedules of compliance" through the 
enforcement process . . . . [P]enalties, when they are assessed, are 
too low to offer [a] meaningful incentive to comply. 47 
More recent studies reach similar conclusions. For instance, the GAO 
found that in fIscal years 1992-1994, one in six major facilities was in sig-
nifIcant noncompliance with its permit limits and that the actual number 
could be twice as high.48 A series of investigations by public interest groups 
have found similar results. For example, a review by the U.S. Public Interest 
Research Group ("PIRG") found that nearly 30% of major facilities exam-
ined were in signifIcant noncompliance during at least one quarter from 
January 1,2000 to March 31, 2001.49 A later analysis found that over 5000 
major facilities, or 81 %, violated their permits at least once in the years 
from 1999 to 2001, a total of 88,000 exceedances.5o 
In early 2003, the EPA conducted a detailed nationwide analysis of 
compliance by major facilities.51 The report showed that approximately 25% 
of major facilities were in signifIcant noncompliance with their CW A per-
46. U.S. GEN. Acer. OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: MANY VIOLATIONS HAVE NOT RECEIVED 
APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ATIENTION 3 (1996) [hereinafter GAO, WATER POLLUTION]. 
47. ROBERTW. ADLER ET AL., 'fHECLEANWATER Aer: 20 YEARS LATER 166-68 (1993). 
48. GAO, WATER POLLUTION, supra note 46, at 4, 7. 
49. U.S. PuB. INT. RES. GROUP, PERMIT TO POLLUTE: How THE GOVERNMENT'S LAX 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER Aer IS POISONING OUR WATERS 6 (2002), available at 
http://uspirg.orglreports/perrnittopollute2oo2.pdf (Aug. 2002). A study two years earlier found virtually 
identical results from September 1997 to December 1998, see U.S. PuB. INT. RES. GROUP, POISONING 
OUR WATER: How THE GoVERNMENT PERMITS POLLUTION 137 (2000), while an earlier review found 
that during a fifteen-month period from 1995 to early 1996, close to 20% of major dischargers were in 
significant noncompliance in at least one quarter and that 21 % of major industrial dischargers exceeded 
their discharge limits by 50% or more during the first quarter of 1996, see U.S. PuB. INT. RES. GROUP, 
DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS: STATE-BY-STATE VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER Aer By THE 
NATION'S LARGEST FACILITIES (1997). 
50. U.S. PuB. INT. RES. GROUP, IN GROSS VIOLATION: How POLLUTERS ARE FLOODING 
AMERICA'S WATERWAYS WITH TOXIC CHEMICALS 9 (2002), available at 
http://uspirg.orglreports/ingrossviolation2oo2/ingrossviolation_Revised_10_25_02.pdf (Oct. 25, 2002). 
51. This includes facilities regulated by states authorized to implement the NPDES program and by 
EPA regional offices in states that have not received authorization to implement the program. See U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, A PILOT FOR 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SELEerED COMPONENTS OF THE NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM (2003) [hereinafter EPA, PILOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS]. 
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mits at any given time. It noted that rates of significant noncompliance have 
effectively remained steady since 1994.52 The violations, moreover, are of a 
magnitude with potentially serious environmental impacts. Half of the per-
mit exceedances for toxic discharges were more than twice the permitted 
levels; 13% of the exceedances were greater than 1000% over permitted 
levels.53 For conventional pollutants, the exceedances are also high; one 
third of the exceedances were twice permitted levels.54 
The same EPA study also found that levels of CW A enforcement activ-
ity have been declining. From 1999 to 2001, the number of state and EPA 
inspections decreased by 8%.55 The number of EPA and state formal en-
forcement actions dropped by 11 %, and the number of informal actions 
declined by 50%.56 During this period, only 24% of significant violations 
resulted in a formal enforcement response.57 Additionally, a low percentage 
(9%-13%) of enforcement actions are carried out in a "timely and appropri-
ate" fashion, only about 40% of formal actions result in penalties, and aver-
age penalties imposed are low, between $5000 and $6000 per action.58 On 
the other hand, between 1999 and 2001, there was an increase in the per-
centage of enforcement actions resulting in pollutant reductions.59 Interest-
ingly, the study found a modest association between levels of enforcement 
activity and compliance rates, both among EPA regions and states. For ex-
ample, fourteen of twenty-four states (58%) with the worst overall compli-
ance records also had the lowest enforcement activity levels, while fourteen 
out of twenty-three states (61 %) with the lowest activity levels also had the 
worst overall compliance records.60 
52. Id. at I. 7, 11-12. The raw data shows an increase in the rate of significant noncompliance 
between 1994 and 1997, but this is due to changes in the definition of significant noncompliance.ld. at 
2. Of the 25% in significant noncompliance, 16% to 29% remained in that status for two years or longer. 
Major facilities include industrial, municipal, and federal facilities. Id. at 7. 
53. Id.at6-7,11-12. 
54. /d. at 6-7. 
55. /d. at 17-19. For all environmental media, EPA inspections have declined over the past five 
years, by about 24% since 1998, and 12% since 2000. Summnry of EPA Enforcement Statistics for Fiscal 
Year 2002,34 ENVTL. REP. 332, 334 (Feb. 7, 2(03). 
56. See EPA, PiLOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 17-19. The study looked at the 
combined total of EPA informal actions, state informal actions, and EPA formal actions. Id. at 17. In-
formal responses are those without legal force, designed simply to bring the violator into compliance. Id. 
They include phone calls, site visits, warning letters, and notices of violations. Id. Formal responses have 
legal effect and are accompanied by procedural safeguards to protect regulated entities. Id. They can 
include administrative, civil, or criminal actions. Id. A 2003 Knight-Ridder investigation found that in 
approximately the first three years of the Bush Administration, the EPA averaged 35 notices of CW A 
violations per month, compared to approximately 134 notices per month during the Clinton Administra-
tion and the first Bush Administration (a 74% decline). Seth Borenstein, Far Fewer Polluters Punished 
Under Bush Administration, Records Show, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CTR., at 
http://www.commondreams.orglheadlines0311209-02.htm (Dec. 9, 2(03). 
57. See EPA, PiLOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 17-19. 
58. /d. at 3. 
59. Id. at 7. 
60. /d. at 27. Likewise, three of five EPA regions with the worst overall compliance records also 
had the lowest relative activity levels, while two of the five regions with the lowest activity levels also 
had the worst compliance records. Id. 
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Numerous other studies have pointed out serious weaknesses in many 
state enforcement programs, including failure to carry out inspections, fail-
ure to take timely and appropriate enforcement actions, and failure to obtain 
meaningful penalties, including penalties that recover the economic benefit 
of noncompliance.61 A report by a PIRG research foundation lists some re-
cent examples: 
In Wisconsin, a 2001 study by a non-profit group found that only 10 
percent of municipal and industrial facilities in significant noncom-
pliance with their water discharge permits were sent notices of vio-
lation-the first step in the formal enforcement process-by the 
state's Department of Natural Resources between 1990 and 1998. 
Of that number, only one-quarter were referred for prosecution .... 
Maryland auditors investigated the resolution of 13 consent orders 
negotiated between state environmental officials and Clean Water 
Act violators. In five cases, the violator failed to take promised cor-
rective action, yet state officials did not levy additional penalties. In 
one case, a polluter agreed to submit a plan for corrective action by 
the fall of 1997 and pay a fine of $100 per day for each day the plan 
was late. The discharger did not submit the plan and the state did 
not assess the fine. The facility went on to register 13 more viola-
tions of its discharge limits over the next two and a half years be-
fore the state finally took additional enforcement action in 2000. 
A 1999 review [by EPA] of New Hampshire's environmental en-
forcement efforts found that the state relied heavily on informal en-
forcement practices and that penalties were sought against only a 
few of the worst violators each year. The review found "an institu-
tional reluctance to pursue formal enforcement" in the state's water 
pollution control program. 62 
Similarly, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency reported in 2003 
that approximately 18% to 31 % of Minnesota's major facilities have been in 
significant noncompliance in recent years and that 45% of major facilities 
exceeded effluent limits at least once.63 In addition, 6% of facilities never 
submitted required discharge monitoring reports ("DMRs"), and many 
61. For a general discussion, see Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States 
Battlefor the Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,803, 10,807-09 (2000). 
62. TONY DUTZIK, PIRG FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: THE 
FAILURE OF STATE GoVERNMENTS TO ENFORCE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM 17, 19, 24, available at http://www.environmentcolorado.orglreports/envenfco 1 0_02.pdf (Oct. 
2002). 
63. MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, PROGRESS REPORT: WASTEWATER POINT SOURCE 
PERMITTING, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 16 (Feb. 2003) (citing 2002 report by Office of legisla-
tive Auditor), available at 
http://www.pca.state.mn.uslhotllegislature/reportsl2003/index.html. 
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DMRs that were submitted were incomplete. The percentage of permitted 
facilities inspected declined from 32% in 1995 to 17% in 2000 and 12% in 
2001.64 An evaluation prepared by the University of Maryland Law Clinic 
in 2002 concluded: 
[The Maryland Department of Environment] does not have any-
where near enough inspectors to track compliance at major sources 
of air and water pollution. As a result of this shortfall and policy 
decisions made by the Department's leadership over the last several 
years, MOE has de-emphasized traditional enforcement, creating a 
climate that does not effectively deter violations, especially in cir-
cumstances where compliance is costly.65 
In Louisiana, a recent report by the Legislative Auditor's Office docu-
mented wholesale failures in the state's enforcement program.66 It found 
that the state failed to conduct required inspections for 31 % of minor facili-
ties, that 26% of required self-monitoring reports for water were either not 
submitted or could not be located,67 that 80% of water enforcement actions 
were not filed in a timely fashion, and that the department had not collected 
58% of the monetary penalties assessed for water quality violations in fiscal 
years 1999 to 2001.68 
While the above illustrations provide an overall picture, it is worth em-
phasizing that state CW A programs are far from monolithic and that some 
states have strengthened their enforcement and compliance laws in recent 
years. New Jersey and California, for example, have both enacted laws re-
quiring that agencies impose penalties for repeat, serious violations of water 
pollution requirements. 69 At least some anecdotal evidence suggests that 
64. Id. 
65. JENNIFER ABBRUZZESE IT AL.. KEEPING PACE: AN EVALUATION OF MARYLAND'S MOST 
IMpORTANT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND WHAT WE CAN Do TO SOLVE THEM, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/environmentlSenator_Brian_Frosh_Report.pdf (Dec. 18, 2002). 
66. ST. OF LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PERFORMANCE AUDIT 6 (2002), 
available at http://www.lla.state.la.uslperformlDEQ02.pdf. 
67. Id. at 19. 
68. Id. 
69. New Jersey's law, adopted in 1990, provides for mandatory minimum penalties for serious 
violations and significant noncompliance. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58: IOA-IO.1 (West 1992). A serious 
violation is an exceedance of an effluent limit by 20% or more for hazardous pollutants and 40% or more 
for non-hazardous pollutants. Id. § 58: IOA-3v. A significant noncomplier is a permittee who (I) com-
mits a serious violation for the same pollutant at the same discharge point in any two months of any six-
month period; (2) exceeds the monthly average in any four months of the six-month period; or (3) fails 
to submit a completed discharge monitoring report in any two months of any six-month period. Id. § 
58: IOA-3w. New Jersey's law also requires annual inspections of permitted facilities and inspections of 
facilities at which significant noncompliance is identified within sixty days. California's law, first 
adopted in 1999, requires minimum fines of $3000 for serious or repeat violations of state water pollu-
tion control requirements. CAL. WATER CODE § 13385(h)-(i) (West supp. 2004). Serious violations 
include discharges that are 20% or 40% in excess of effluent limits, depending on the pollutant, as well 
as failure to file certain discharge monitoring reports. 'd. § 13385(h)(2). In 2003, California expanded 
the reach of this law to cover noncompliance with additional reporting requirements. 2003 CAL. LEGIS. 
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these laws have improved compliance. According to the New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection, since the early 1990s, the number of 
total violations, serious violations, and instances of significant noncompli-
ance have dropped by amounts ranging from 80% to 90%.70 Likewise, ac-
cording to an analysis by Environment California, between 2000 and 2002 
(following enactment of the state's mandatory penalty law), there was a 
41 % reduction in the number of clean water permit violations in Califor-
nia.71 
Besides weak enforcement by states, compliance efforts also are im-
peded by limitations in EPA's data management systems. For instance, a 
2002 audit by EPA's Inspector General found that "EPA's Permit Compli-
ance System-its national permitting and enforcement system-was incom-
plete, inaccurate and obsolete . . . . Hundreds of thousands of dischargers 
were not monitored by the system.,,72 The report estimated that EPA lacks 
data on an estimated 96% of storm water discharges, 65% of discharges 
from concentrated animal feeding operations, and thousands of minor dis-
chargers.73 It also noted the failure of officials in the states examined to 
identify significant violators by major sources. These findings were con-
firmed in another Inspector General report a year later, which found that 
EPA had made slow progress in fixing the flaws in the system.74 (Eighteen 
states use EPA's computer system as their primary tool for enforcing the 
CWA.) 
Moreover, many states fail to fully monitor the condition of their water 
bodies as required by the CW A. For instance, according to the EPA, as of 
1998, states have assessed water quality for only 23% of the nation's rivers 
and streams; 42% of its lakes, ponds, and reservoirs; and 32% of its estuar-
ies.75 Even for those water bodies that have been assessed, the data is often 
unreliable and inconsistent across states (or even over time within the same 
state). The GAO found in 2000 that only six states reported that they had a 
SERVo 609 (West) (A.B. 1541). 
70. N.J. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT 
ACT 19-34 (1999). The 1998 report shows decreases from 1992 to 1998 in serious violations, instances 
of significant noncompliance, and penalties assessed, and decreases from 1993 to 1998 in total violations 
and enforcement actions. See id. The report also credits the department's expanded compliance assis-
tance activities for playing a significant role in improving compliance. Id. at 32. 
71. Assembly Hoor Analysis, A.B. 1541, available at 
http://info.sen.ca.gov/publbilUasmlab_1501-1550/ab_1541_cfa_20030910_014035_asm_tloor.html 
(Sept. 2, 2003). Environment California was the prime supporter of the legislation.ld. 
72. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER ENFORCEMENT: STATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CLEAN WATER ACT DISCHARGES CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE 38 (2001) [hereinafter 
EPA, WATER ENFORCEMENT], available at http://www.house.gov/georgemiller!cwaenforce.pdf. 
73. Id. at 19-21. Although many states were developing their own systems, they did not fill the 
information void. Id. at ii. 
74. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA SHOULD TAKE fuRTHER STEPS 
TO ADDRESS fuNDING SHORTFALLS AND TIME SLIPPAGES IN PERMIT COMPLIANCE SYSTEM 
MODERNIZATION EFFORT (2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oigearthlreportsI2003120030520_2003-M-OOOI4.pdf. 
75. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION'S WATER: A 
SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2000), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/98report/98brochure.pdf (Jan. 2000). 
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majority of the data needed to assess whether their waters meet water qual-
. d d 76 Ity stan ar s. 
In theory, flaws in state implementation of the CW A should be reme-
died by the EPA in its role of overseeing state programs. In practice, how-
ever, the EPA has had only limited success in promoting better state per-
formance. Numerous studies show that EPA oversight of state programs has 
been inconsistent and not particularly effective, for a variety of reasons.77 In 
some cases, regional EPA administrators and regional EPA offices (the pri-
mary interlocutors with the states) feel loyalties to and develop close rela-
tionships with the states that they oversee; 78 in other cases, they may feel 
intimidated by the prospect of tangling with governors or state congres-
sional delegations. Some oversight tools, such as "overfiling" and with-
drawing authority for poorly performing states, are so politically charged 
and resource-intensive that they are rarely used by the EPA.79 Other tradi-
tional oversight techniques also have not been especially effective.80 To cite 
one among many recent examples, earlier this year EPA's Inspector General 
found that despite well-documented problems with Louisiana's water (and 
air and hazardous waste) programs, as noted above, the EPA's regional of-
fice lacked a plan for conducting oversight of the state's programs, did not 
hold the state accountable for meeting its commitments or escalate oversight 
in response to poor performance, and did not ensure that data submitted by 
the state was accurate.81 
76. EPA, WATER ENFORCEMENT, supra note 72, at 12. 
77. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATEIFEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 117-19, 168 (2003). 
78. /d. at 118-19. As Professor Joel Mintz has observed, the attitudes and preferences of regional 
EPA administrators are often significantly shaped by state politicians and state environmental officials, 
whose support helped them get appointed in the first place. JOEL MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: 
HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 13, 74-75 (1995). 
79. Overfiling refers to the filing of a suit by the EPA against an alleged violator even though the 
state has already initiated its own enforcement action against the party alleging the same violation(s). 
The EPA appears to overfile in approximately 0.1 % to 0.3% of federal enforcement actions. 
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 77, at 339. In approximately the first three years of the Bush 
Administration, the EPA overfiled in six cases (none of them under the CWA). E-mail from Gary Jonesi, 
Senior Counsel for Strategic Litigation, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, EPA (Nov. 24,2(03) (listing 
overfilings initiated by the EPA from January 20, 2001 to November 24, 2003) (copy on file with au-
thor). The EPA has rarely if ever actually withdrawn a state's authorization. RECHTSCHAFFEN & 
MARKELL, supra note 77, at 330. 
80. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 77, at 289. 
81. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA REGION 6 NEEDS TO IMPROVE 
OVERSIGHT OF LoUISIANA'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 3-11 (2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reportsl200312003-p-0005.pdf. In October 2001, the Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic filed a petition with the EPA requesting that it withdraw authorization for Louisiana's water 
program. Mark Schleifstein, EPA Puts Pressure on State DEQ, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 15,2003, at I, 
available at 2003 WL 3993211. In February 2003, the EPA informed Louisiana that unless it made a 
series of improvements to its water program, the EPA would consider initiating withdrawal proceedings. 
{d. 
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III. THE RESOURCE GAP IN NPDES PROGRAMS 
At the same time that state NPDES programs are falling short in their 
performance, resources available to them are growing scarcer. While state 
environmental spending grew rapidly during the late 1980s and mid-
1990s,82 the rate of spending increases slowed in the late 1990s.83 In 2001, 
the impact of the recession hit the states, leading to major budget shortfalls 
and cutbacks in spending on environmental protection. The Environmental 
Council of States ("ECOS"), an organization of state and territorial envi-
ronmental commissioners, found that in fiscal year 2002, thirty of forty-two 
states responding to its survey were forced to cut their environmental budg-
ets, by an average of six percent.84 Operating budgets absorbed about three 
quarters of the cuts. Staff actions-leaving a position vacant or instituting a 
hiring freeze-were the most commonly mentioned ways for meeting the 
budget reductions. More cuts were made in fiscal year 2003, as overall state 
spending on environmental protection and natural resources programs 
dropped by another 1.6%.85 ECOS reports that states spent 1.4% of their 
total state budgets on environmental protection and natural resources in 
2003; this is the lowest percentage in the seventeen years that ECOS (or 
similar groups) has been calculating these numbers.86 Notably, federal con-
tributions to state programs have increased significantly in the past few 
years, from $3.75 billion in 1999 to $5 billion in 2003.87 Absent these addi-
tional contributions, state program cuts would have been far more precipi-
tous. 
These cuts are unwelcome at any time and for any program, but the ef-
fects are particularly acute given the glaring resource needs of state water 
programs, including NPDES programs. In the late 1990s, a statelEPA task 
force undertook a major project to measure states' spending on water qual-
ity programs and forecast their resource needs for fully implementing the 
CWA's requirements.88 The study (known as the "State Water Quality 
82. ECOS estimates that from 1986 to 1996, state spending on environmental and natural resource 
programs increased from $5.2 billion to $12.5 billion. R. Steven Brown, The States Protect the Environ-
ment, ECOSTATES, Summer 1999, available at http://www.sso.orglecos/publications/statesarticle.htm. 
83. R. Steven Brown, Coping With the Budget Crunch: When the Axe Falls: How State Environ-
mental Agencies Deal with Budget Cuts, ECOSTATES, Winter 2002, at 16, available at 
http://www.sso.orglecosIECOStatesArticleslbrown.pdf [hereinafter Brown, Coping]; R. Steven Brown, 
States Put Their Money Where Their Environment Is, ECOSTATES, Spring 2001, at 22, 26, available at 
http://www.sso.orglecosIECOStatesArticles/rsbrown.pdf. 
84. Brown, Coping, supra note 83, at 16, 17. 
85. R. Steven Brown & Michael 1. Kiefer, ECOS Budget Survey: Budgets are Bruised, but Still 
Strong, ECOSTATES, Summer 2003, at 10, available at 
http://www.sso.orglecosIECOStatesArticleslSummer%202003%20ECOStates.pdf. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 15. During this period, the federal share of total state environmental and natural resources 
spending increased from 25% to 33%. !d. 
88. Ass'n of SI. & Interstate Water Pollution Control Adm'rs, State Water Quality Management 
Resource Analysis: Interim Repon on Results (Apr. I, 2002), available at 
http://www.asiwpca.orglprograms/docs/gap.pdf. Approximately thirty-seven states responded to a sur-
vey about their actual expenditures, and twenty-two provided information needed to complete an exten-
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Management Resource Analysis" or the "Gap Analysis" for short) estimated 
that state resource needs were in the range of $1.54 billion to $1.68 billion; 
that state expenditures were in the range of $722 million to $805 million; 
and that the resulting gap between needs and expenditures is between $735 
million and $960 million.89 Overall, state agencies are receiving less than 
one-half of the resources they need to fully implement the statute's require-
ments.90 ECOS reported similar results in 2003, estimating that in fiscal 
year 2002, the gap between funding and state resource needs for water qual-
ity programs was $800 million.91 The Gap Analysis and a very similar but 
slightly updated survey by the National Academy of Public Administration 
("NAPA") reported that funding for state programs comes from a variety of 
sources. According to the NAPA survey, 37% came from state revenues; 
37% from federal contributions; 19% from fee revenues; and 6% from other 
sources (e.g., special funds, special taxes, bond funds, etc).92 
The budget woes of the states have prompted some to consider return-
ing authorization of their programs to EPA. For example, according to a 
news report in August 2003, officials at a meeting of EPA's Environmental 
Financial Advisory Board reported that Missouri, Kansas, and Iowa officials 
were considering returning their NPDES programs back to the EPA.93 
(Also, in Missouri, during the summer of 2003, the federal Office of Surface 
Mining assumed control of most of the federal surface mining program that 
had been delegated to the state after the state legislature forced its hand by 
eliminating funding for most of the state's program.94) 
sive model of future resource needs. /d. Funding shortfalls for CW A enforcement has been a persistent 
problem; as pointed out by Susan Hunter and Richard Waterman, a General Accounting Office report in 
1980 found that staff vacancies at state agencies in the area of water control ranged from 7% to 20%. 
SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER 
ACTS 223 (1996). 
89. Ass'n of St. & Interstate Water Pollution Control Adm'rs, supra note 88, at 4-7. 
90. [d. The analysis covers only state management activities, not spending on infrastructure im-
provements. A review of the Gap Analysis by the NAPA (discussed below) concluded that its estimate 
of the resource gap is sound and, if anything, is probably low because it does not include the costs of 
new and expanding water programs and may also underestimate the costs of state employees. NAT'L 
ACAD. OF Pus. ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING WHAT STATES NEED To PROTECT WATER QUALITY I (2002) 
[hereinafter NAPA, UNDERSTANDING]. 
91. Envtl. Council of Sts., Comments on the Environmental Protection Agency FY 2005 Budget 
Request (June 27, 2003) (copy on file with author). 
92. NAPA, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 90, at 25-26. The Gap Analysis found that of total state 
spending, 40% came from state tax revenues, 31 % from federal contributions, 19% from state fee pro-
grams, and 10% from other sources. Ass'n of SI. & Interstate Water Pollution Control Adm'rs, supra 
note 88, at 6-7. There is additional anecdotal evidence of overwhelmed state agencies. The Detroit News 
recently found that the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality has five employees to handle 
enforcement of a range of water quality and water pollution issues, including permit limits, drinking 
water quality, and wetlands protection. Brad Heath. Great Lakes Polluters Dump Without Fear, Part 2. 
DETROIT NEWS. Oct. 5, 2003, available at 
http://www.detnews.comlspecialreportsl2003/polluters/index.htm. The department's enforcement unit 
acknowledged that "[t]here are a substantial number of violations we cannot adequately address with our 
current staff resources." [d. Lack of state resources has also led to infrequent evaluations of facility 
discharge monitoring reports. [d. 
93. States Urge EPA to Push White House for Sufficient Funds in FY 05. 24 INSIDE EPA. No. 33 
(Aug. 15.2003). 
94. John Pendergrass, Budget Woes: MO Gives Back SMCRA, 20 ENVTL. F. 6,6 (Sept.-Oct. 2003). 
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The federal government, facing its own mounting deficits, is unlikely to 
significantly augment its contributions to state programs beyond the in-
creases noted above. Indeed, states have complained for a number of years 
that federal grants have failed to include adjustments for inflation.95 In the 
area of enforcement, the EPA has seen its own resources stretched thinner, 
and for each of the past three years, the Bush Administration has cut back 
the EPA's proposed budget before submitting it to Congress.96 From 2001 
to 2003, the EPA's enforcement and inspection staff decreased by over 
12%.97 Since September 11, numerous criminal investigators from the EPA 
have been assigned to help work on Homeland Security investigations and 
also to provide protective services when the EPA Administrator travels.98 
Resource shortfalls at the Department of Justice have resulted in civil en-
forcement cases referred by the EPA (regarding water pollution, drinking 
water, and other important problems) being ignored or delayed for months.99 
The Gap Analysis focused on gaps in overall state water programs. 100 
To supplement these findings with specific data about NPDES programs, 
and also to obtain some sense of the impacts of recent budget cuts on these 
programs, this author conducted a short survey of states that are currently 
authorized to fully implement the NPDES program. 101 The survey asked 
about several aspects of their NPDES programs for the period 2000 to 2002, 
including personnel and resources devoted to permitting, monitoring, en-
forcement and compliance assistance programs; examples of how budget 
shortfalls had impacted their program; and what level of funding they be-
lieved was necessary to meet all their mandates. Of the forty-five states to 
which I sent surveys, seventeen replied. 
While the survey is not intended to be comprehensive or definitive, it 
does illustrate some general trends. Overall, the responses confirm that the 
state-authorized NPDES programs have been significantly impacted by 
shrinking funding and face major gaps between program needs and avail-
able resources. 102 Of the responding states, twelve said they had been forced 
95. Envtl. Council of Sts., supra note 91. 
96. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST ON EPA 
ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, Report No. 2004-S-00001, at 7-9 (Oct. 10,2003) 
[hereinafter EPA, CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST]. 
97. See ROBERT PERKS & GREGORY WETSTONE, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, REWRITING THE 
RULES, YEAR-END REPORT 2002: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ASSAULT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 26 
(2003), available at http://www.nrdc.orgllegislationlrollbackslrr2002.pdf. 
98. EPA, CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST, supra note 96, at 15. 
99. Statement of Joel A. Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center and 
Member Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation, to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcomm. on 
Energy Policy, Nat. Res. & Reg. Aff., submitted to the record for hearing held in Boston, Mass. (Oct. 14, 
2003) (copy on file with author). The 2003 Knight-Ridder study mentioned above found that most indi-
ces of enforcement activity for the CW A (as well as other statutes) had dropped in the first three years of 
the Bush Administration. See Borenstein, supra note 56. 
100. According to the Gap Analysis, expenditures associated with NPDES programs, including 
permitting, compliance, and enforcement activities, represent approximately 37% of total state water 
quality expenditures. Ass'n of SI. & Interstate Water Pollution Control Adm'rs, supra note 88, at 6. 
IO\. For the results of the author's survey, see Table I infra. 
102. See Table I infra. 
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to make budget cuts; five said they had not. \03 Maryland, for example, from 
2002 to 2004, cut back 7% of its compliance staff (and anticipates addi-
tional cuts in the upcoming year), leading it to conclude in internal budget 
analyses that the impacts would be poorer water quality and a high risk of 
public health effects. 104 Wyoming reported that inspections had been cut 
and monitoring had been limited. \05 Washington officials said there was a 
backlog in permits, fewer inspections, and less technical assistance pro-
vided. 106 Several states, including Georgia, North Carolina, and Hawaii, 
reported freezing program positions (and in some cases, freezing sala-
ries). \07 Oregon noted that because of a permanent cut of two positions from 
its permitting staff, there would be delays in issuing permits for at least 25 
smaller communities and 400 construction sites. \08 California reported that 
its regional boards had "reduced their commitments" to perform virtually all 
aspects of the regulatory program, including reissuing expired or expiring 
permits, conducting inspections, issuing enforcement orders, responding to 
public complaints, and handling cases. \09 Arizona responded that during 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004, "our water programs have received budget and 
personnel cuts due to state budget constraints. This has impacted compli-
ance/enforcement programs and all water programs." Minnesota's com-
ments reflect the predicament facing many states: 
As with most, if not all states, Minnesota's NPDES program has 
been and continues to be squeezed between rising program demands 
and expectations and stagnant or declining revenues. On the reve-
nue side, a major problem continues to be the lack of inflationary 
adjustments at both the federal and state levels. With each passing 
year, the federal grants and state appropriations simply buy less 
program delivery so expectations and deliverables will have to be 
adjusted accordingly .... Minnesota has taken some steps to ad-
dress these problems, but taken individually or even as a group, 
they do not address the long term problem of fund shortages. An-
nual water quality permit fees and application fees have been in-
creased but still fund less than a third of the program. . . . In the 
past, the legislature has provided stop gap funding to the program 
on a one time basis, but that is not to be considered a reliable long 
term funding solution. I \0 
103. [d. 
1M. Telephone Interview with Pam Wright. Program Administrator, Maryland Department of Envi-
ronment (Dec. 2,2003). 





110. Author's Survey Results (on file with author); see also MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL 
AGENCY, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 63, at 23 (agency estimates that an additional nine full-time 
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TABLE 1: STATE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE NEEDS 






State Needed in 
By Current 
Recent 
$ Million Budget Cuts 
Level of 
Resources 
Alabama Adequate 100% None 
Budget & Personnel Cuts; 
Arizona 2.9 30% 
CompliancelEnforcement, 
All Water Programs 
Impacted 




49.3 Currently 23% (est) 
to Virtually All 
Funded 
Aspects of Program 
Calif. 
200 Positions v. Staff Departures, 
Stormwater 
119 Currently 60% (est) Shift in Personnel, 
Funded Loss of Interns 
Delaware Adequate 100% None 
Florida 5 90% None 
Georgia 21.5 20% Positions Frozen 
Hawaii 3.6(wffMDL)** 58% Positions Frozen 
Maryland 17,604,566 50% 6% Cut in Positions 
Staff Transferred, 
Minnesota 8,161,000 90% 





Level to Meet 






New Jersey 15.76 100% None 
Nevada 0.2 100% None 
employees, an estimated $740,000 annually, would need to be allocated to wastewater point-source 
program to meet federal goals). 
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TABLE I : STATE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE NEEDS 




Impacts of Needs Met 
State Needed in By Current Recent $ Million Budget Cuts Level of 
Resources 
2 Positions Eliminated; 
68 Positions v. Permit Delays 
Oregon 56 Currently 82% (est.) for 400 Construction 
Funded Sites, 25 Small 
Communities 
Fewer Inspections, 
Washington l3.1 85% Technical Assistance, 
Backlog in Permits 




General Revenues to Fees 
Wyoming 5.5 29% 
Fewer Inspections & 
Less Monitoring 
* Source: Author's Survey and Results 
** Includes expenditures on the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) 
program. 
Thirteen of the responding states indicated that there were shortfalls in 
the level of funding needed to adequately meet all federal and state statutory 
mandates. I I I As indicated in Table 1, the shortfalls identified were often 
significant, such as by Georgia (five times current level of funding needed), 
California (more than four times current level needed), Wyoming (three 
times current level), and Maryland (two times current level).112 Montana's 
response was that "to better meet our mandates in a timely manner we might 
need twice our resources.,,113 Other data prepared by Wisconsin in 2001 (not 
in connection with this survey) estimated that its resource gap for water 
quality compliance programs was $5.3 million and for enforcement pro-
grams, $1.2 million. I 14 
Ill. Id. 
112. See id. Notably, current staff levels for California's wastewater discharge program are only 
about 55% of the level (49.3/87.4) that the state committed to in its Memorandum of Agreement with the 
EPA (the document spelling out the state's obligations for implementing the NPDES program once it 
receives authorization from the EPA). 
113. Author's Survey Results (on file with author). 
114. Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., Bureau of Watershed Mgmt., Wisconsin Expenditure Data and State 
Water Quality Management Workload Model Summary of Needs (May 11,2001) (on file with author). 
Another report to the California legislature by the State Water Resources Control Board in 2000 esti-
mated that the state would need 1674 positions, plus $8.6 million in annual spending on outside con-
tracts, to comply with both current and anticipated future mandates for its core water regulatory program 
(a large portion of which is the state's NPDES program). To put this in context, at the time of the report, 
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The states that reported fewer cuts generally were those more heavily 
supported by permit fees (as noted below, not all states with fee programs 
authorize fees at levels that fully fund their programs, and in some states 
fees can be used for other purposes). For example, Florida, which is re-
quired to have a program fully supported by fees, indicated that it experi-
enced no budget cuts or layoffs. 115 Nevada, which also is 100% fee-
supported, also did not make any cuts; it reported that after the agency faced 
shortfalls four years ago, "[ w]e were able to raise fees with the support of 
the regulated community. We also built in an automatic increase [of 3%] 
due to inflation. We are doing well.,,1l6 New Jersey likewise has a fee pro-
gram which insures that the Department of Environmental Protection can 
recover all of the costs of administering its permit system (which covers 
both the NPDES program and state discharge requirements); thus its pro-
gram has not been impacted by recent state budget problems. ll7 West Vir-
ginia (83% fee supported) reported that through its fee program it was able 
to save five positions that it otherwise would have been forced to cut be-
cause of reductions in general fund monies. lIS Other states are moving in 
the direction of greater reliance on fees. Oregon, for example, responded 
that "[a]s general funds become increasingly scarce, [we are] relying more 
heavily on fees.,,119 California increased its fees in 2002 and again in 2003 
to offset the severe shortfall facing the state's general fund; the state's 2003 
Budget Act requires that the entire general fund portion of the state's core 
water quality regulatory program be paid for by permit fees. 120 Other states 
reported that fee increases are not currently feasible. For example, Washing-
ton officials, after noting that its fee program is currently underfunded by 
roughly 20%, noted that increasing fees was not desirable, "especially in the 
current economy."l2l 
As resources grow scarcer, it makes sense for other states to shift more 
of the costs of implementing their NPDES programs to regulated entities 
these programs were staffed by 414 people. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., Final Report, Core Regu-
latory Programs' Needs Analysis I, 9 (2000), available at 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/legislative/docs/finalcorereg.pdf. 
115. Author's Survey Results (on file with author). 
116. Telephone Interview with Darrell Rasner, Technical Services Branch Supervisor, Nevada Bu-
reau of Water Pollution Control (Nov. 26, 2003).The Bureau of Water Pollution Control apparently was 
able to win support among regulated entities for a fee increase by holding out the prospect that the state's 
NPDES program otherwise would have to be returned to EPA to administer. /d. 
117. Under New Jersey law, the Department of Environmental Protection is authorized to assess fees 
necessary to administering the permit program. Telephone Interview with William F. Boehle, Chief, 
Bureau of Permit Management, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (Nov. 26,2003). In 
the past, the State Department of Treasury funded some portion of the costs of the program (in 2002, 
approximately 20%), meaning that the department could assess fees at a somewhat lower level. [d. 
According the Chief of the New Jersey Bureau of Permit Management, over the past two years, the state 
has required that the permit program fully recoup its operating costs through fees. [d. 
118. See supra Table I. 
119. Author's Survey Results (on file with author). 
120. See Cal. Water Res. Control Bd. Res. No. 2003-0064 (citing Budget Act) (Sept. 30, 2003), 
available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdeclresltnl2003/03res.html. 
121. Author's Survey Results (on file with author). 
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through permit fee programs. The Clean Air Act, for example, requires 
states to impose permit fees sufficient to fund the costs of administering and 
enforcing their Title V permit programs. 122 Most states now do collect fees 
from NPDES-permitted facilities; the NAPA study referenced above found 
that of thirty-seven states surveyed, thirty-two collect permit fees, although 
in many cases they cover only a portion of the state's program costS.123 A 
more detailed survey by the Association of State and Interstate Water Pollu-
tion Control Administrators in 2003 found that of twenty-two states re-
sponding, seventeen had permit fees. 124 Of these seventeen, ten use the fee 
proceeds solely for NPDES-related activities; in five states, the proceeds 
can fund any water program activity; in five, the fees were deposited into 
the general fund; and in two states, the fee proceeds could be used only to a 
very limited extent or not at all for water quality programs. 125 While there 
remain substantial political and other constraints to increasing fees from 
regulated entities, in the long run greater reliance on fees likely will prove 
essential to bridging the gap between state resources and program needs. 126 
IV. USING THE POWER OF SPOTLIGHTING 
TO REDUCE THE PERFORMANCE GAP 
As the above discussion illustrates, the clear Congressional and public 
desire for strong enforcement of the CW A is being undermined by deficien-
cies in enforcement efforts and resource shortfalls. How, then, can enforce-
ment of the CW A be improved? Resource shortfalls seem likely to be a con-
stant; if anything, they may grow to larger proportions as NPDES programs 
expand to cover thousands of additional sources such as stormwater dis-
chargers and Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations ("CAFOs"). Stricter 
state oversight of state programs is desirable as well but is unlikely to pro-
duce any dramatic changes given the past track record of EPA timidity in 
this area. 
In recent years, a lively debate has raged about what type of enforce-
ment approach best achieves compliance with environmental laws. 127 The 
122. 42 U.S.C. § 766 I a(b)(3)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(7). 
123. NAPA. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 90. 
124. ASS'N OF ST. & INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AoM'RS, FEE SURVEY RESULTS I 
(2003), available at http://www.asiwpca.org/homeJdocsINPDESFeeSurveySummary.pdf. 
125. [d. 
126. Proponents of fee programs argue that it is only fair to require entities that benefit from being 
allowed to dispose of their wastes in the nation's waters to pay for a regulatory program designed to 
protect the quality of those waters. On the other hand, fee programs that force regulated entities to 
shoulder more of the costs of NPDES programs, especially as program costs rise, may generate concen-
trated opposition from powerful industrial groups. 
127. Compare David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Ra-
tional Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917 (2001), and Bruce M. Diamond, Con-
fessions of an Environmental Enforcer, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,252 (1996), with Clifford Rechtschaffen, 
Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1181 (1998) [hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation]. See also Joel Mintz, Scrutinizing 
Environmental Enforcement: A Comment on a Recent Discussion at the MIS, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,639 (2000). 
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EPA traditionally has favored a deterrence-based approach, one that relies 
on inspections, formal enforcement responses, and sanctions in the event of 
violations (although its commitment to this approach has been wavering 
under the current Bush Administration, at least among its top-level political 
appointees).128 The states by and large have preferred a more conciliatory, 
cooperative-based model that relies more on incentives and technical assis-
tance programs to achieve compliance. Interestingly, at least one recent 
public opinion survey indicates that there is substantial support for tradi-
tional government enforcement as compared to more flexible, "industry 
friendly" approaches. 129 I have argued elsewhere that a deterrence-based 
approach, informed by positive elements of cooperation-based enforcement, 
is the best way to improve rates of compliance. 130 
There is also a third avenue, however, that can effectively serve as a 
supplement or adjunct to any type of primary enforcement mechanism-
whether it be a deterrence-based approach, cooperation-based approach, or 
something in between. This third approach, which relies on the mechanism 
of mandatory disclosure of enforcement and compliance related data, has 
yet to be exploited by environmental regulators. Yet, as discussed below, it 
has the potential to significantly improve the results achieved by existing 
enforcement schemes while requiring relatively few resources to imple-
ment. l3l 
The technique of using information disclosure, or spotlighting, to 
achieve environmental objectives has become increasingly popular in the 
past two decades. It enjoys support across the political spectrum-
economists like it because it relies on the efficiency of market forces, while 
environmental advocates favor it because it can promote citizen empower-
ment and create incentives for firms to reduce harmful activities. It also has 
proven to be quite effective in recent years. Indeed, the specter of having 
unfavorable information disclosed publicly has shown itself to be a very 
strong motivator of improved performance. 
A spotlighting approach can be employed at a variety of institutional 
levels and for a variety of regulatory ends. This Part describes three ways in 
which spotlighting can be utilized to remediate the performance gap in 
NPDES programs: (1) an EPA spotlight on the enforcement and compli-
128. See Mintz, supra note 99. 
129. In that survey, conducted in 2000, respondents were asked to describe which approach comes 
closer to their view: (I) government should strongly enforce environmental laws and require industry 
and businesses to follow those laws; or (2) government should work with industry and business to meet 
environmental goals using flexible regulations and economic incentives. The results are set forth as 
follows: Government strongly enforce much-34%; Government strongly enforce somewhat-28%; 
flexible regulations somewhat-I 9%; flexible regulations much-I 2%; Both (vol.}-5%; Don't 
knowlRefused-2%. Tarrance Group & Greenberg-Quinlan Research, Inc., Nov. 12-19,2000 (n = 1200 
national registered voters), Q28, available at 
http://www.greenbergresearch.com/publications/reports/fqIcvefpoIl111200.pdf. 
130. See Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation, supra note 127. 
131. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environmentalism, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 801,817-21 
(2000) (describing information disclosure strategies as promising "third way" solution that bridges the 
gap between prescriptive regulation and reliance on common law to deal with environmental problems). 
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ance-related records of regulated firms; (2) an EPA spotlight on the per-
formance of state NPDES programs in achieving compliance among regu-
lated firms within their states; and (3) expanding the mandatory environ-
mental disclosure requirements for publicly-traded corporations. 
A. Spotlighting Business Enforcement and Compliance History 
As recent experience has shown, mandated disclosure of data, such as a 
facility's emissions and exposures to toxic chemicals from consumer prod-
ucts or other sources, has been quite successful in improving environmental 
performance. The most prominent example is the Toxic Release Inventory 
("TRI") program, enacted as part of the Emergency Planning & Community 
Right-to-Know Act in 1986. 132 TRI requires manufacturing and certain 
other industrial facilities to annually disclose their releases and transfers of 
654 specified toxic chemicals, subject to reporting thresholds. 133 Facilities 
subject to this program from 1988 to 2001 have reported a remarkable 
54.5% decline in their releases of covered chemicals. 134 California's Propo-
sition 65, which requires warnings prior to exposures to listed carcinogens 
and reproductive toxins, has also generated substantial reductions in indus-
trial air emissions and significant reformulations of consumer products con-
taining toxic chemicals, including brass faucets, ceramic ware, calcium sup-
plements, water meters, water filters, baby rash powders and creams, anti-
diarrheal medications, hair dyes, wooden playground structures, and port-
able classrooms, among other productS. 135 One public interest attorney esti-
mates that as a result of Proposition 65 enforcement actions filed against 
thirty facilities over the past five years, the facilities collectively reduced 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 11023. 
133. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY, TRION-SITE AND OFF-SITE 
RELEASES, 1988, 1998 and 2000-0 I, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridataltriO I/press/rel-tab le880 I. pdf. 
134. See id. Professor Bradley C. Karkkainen describes TRI as a "watershed" in efforts to enhance 
environmental performance. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information As Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 260 (2001). See also 
Mary Graham & Catherine Miller, Disclosure of Toxic Releases in the United States, 43 ENV'T 8, 11-12 
(Oct. 200 I) (concluding that "[a] close examination of the TRI data [from 1988 to 1999] confirms a core 
of positive trends"); but see Alexander Volokh, The Pitfalls of the Environmental Right-to-Know, 2002 
UTAH L. REV. 805, 814-19 (arguing that it is difficult to know if the reported reductions in TRI releases 
are real or accurate and that data generated by TRI and other right-ta-know laws is "irredeemably mis-
leading"). 
135. Clifford Rechtschaffen, How to Reduce Lead Exposures with One Simple Statute: The Experi-
ence of Proposition 65, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,581 (1999); Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: 
Evaluating Warnings Under California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 341-43 (l996); David 
Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,232 (2002); Jane 
Kay, Sierra Club Picks Activist President; Marin Man Uses Lawsuits to Force Action, S.F. CHRONICLE, 
May 22, 2003, at A21; Ctr. for Envtl. Health, Prop 65 Case Highlights (undated memo, on file with 
author). A 2000 Gallup poll found that 73% of the public in 2000 bought a product specifically because 
they thought it was better for the environment than competing products. See GUBER, supra note 36, at 
50. See also id. at 51 (1992 survey reported that three fourths of public were at least sometimes influ-
enced by environmental claims in marketplace and most appeared willing to spend at least 5% more for 
products known to be environmentally safe). 
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their emissions of perchloroethylene, a listed carcinogen, by approximately 
640,000 pounds. 136 
Related, public disclosure of a firm's record of compliance can stimu-
late improved performance, as borne out by a number of studies (additional 
studies showing how the stock market reacts negatively to poor environ-
mental performance are discussed in the section below).137 For example, 
when the Missouri Department of Natural Resources began issuing news 
releases about public water systems that violate monitoring requirements 
and posting these releases on the Internet, it found that notifying the viola-
tors in advance resulted in 80% of chronic violators coming into compliance 
within one month.138 In another program, Indonesia's environmental agency 
developed a color-coded grading system for evaluating the environmental 
performance of industrial facilities. 139 The grades for the facilities were pub-
licly disclosed, although there was a six-month delay in disclosing firms in 
the worst two categories to allow them an opportunity to improve their per-
formance. Rates of compliance among participating factories increased from 
35% to 51 %, and discharges on average declined by 43%.140 Likewise, a 
study of compliance and emission levels over a six-year period by pulp and 
paper firms in British Columbia found significant impacts when the regional 
environmental agency published a list of firms significantly out of compli-
ance. Being on the list of noncompliers led to significant emission reduc-
tions, reductions that actually exceeded those attributable to enforcement 
orders and penalties assessed against the firms. 141 
In another recent analysis, Professors Kagan, Gunningham, and Thorton 
assessed the determinants of environmental performance of fourteen pulp 
and paper manufacturing mills in several countries. They concluded that 
variations in social pressures (among other factors) had a significant effect 
on firms' relative performance. According to the authors, many mill manag-
ers spoke of having to meet not only the terms of their regulatory license but 
of their "social license" from the community. They report that managers at 
one facility "told us that the sanction it feared the most ... were not legal 
136. Telephone Interview with Michael Freund, Dec. 5, 2003. The sources of perchloroethylene were 
dry cleaners, degreasers, and the motion picture industry (perchloroethylene is used to clean film). 
137. This discussion is in part adapted from RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 77. 
138. ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STS., ENSURING COMPLIANCE: STATE BEST PRACTICES 2, 15-16 (May 
2000). 
139. Shakeb Afsah & Jeffrey R. Vincent, Harvard Inst. In!'1 Dev., Putting Pressure on Polluters: 
Indonesia's PROPER Program (last modified Sept. 23,1999), at 
http://www.worldbank.orglnipr/work_paper/vincentlindex.htm. The colors were chosen because they 
had cultural connotations in Indonesia analogous to the environmental performance levels they signified. 
140. Shakeb Afsah, PROPER Program for Pollution Control Environmental Evaluation and Rating: 
A Model for Promoting Environmental Compliance and Strengthening Transparency and Community 
Participation in Developing Countries 18 (copy on file with author); Shakeb Afsah et aI., Regulation in 
the Information Age: Indonesian Public Information Programfor Environmental Management 9 (1997), 
available at http://www.worldbank.orglnipr/work_paper/goveml. 
141. Jerome Foulon et aI., Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation and (?) or (?) Information, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2291 (Feb. I, 2000), available at 
http://www.econ.worJdbank.orgldocs/I042.pdf. 
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but informal sanctions imposed by the public and the media, and hence it 
was motivated less by avoiding regulatory sanctions per se as 'anything that 
could give you a bad name.',,142 
Perhaps the boldest enforcement-related spotlight is that launched by 
Great Britain's Environmental Agency five years ago. The agency annually 
publishes a "Spotlight on Business Environmental Performance," detailing 
the environmental performance of various business sectors and the firms 
within them. 143 Within each sector, the report highlights good and bad per-
formers, pollution accidents, and fines assessed. The performance of firms 
is graded according to a scoring system developed by the agency, based on 
the inherent risks of processes at a facility and the operator's ability to man-
age these environmental risks (one system for waste facilities, another for 
non-waste facilities). 
Britain's "Spotlight" report goes well beyond disclosure efforts tried in 
this country to date in a couple of significant ways. First, the government is 
actively involved in evaluating private firm performance; as a result, the 
evaluations are likely to have considerable credibility with the public. 144 
Second, the environmental agency presents the information in comparative 
form, directly contrasting good and bad performers (including some case 
studies), and explicitly drawing attention to firms that were penalized the 
most or responsible for the most spills in the prior year. A few examples 
from the 2002 report are reproduced below (see attached charts). 
142. Robert Kagan et aI., Explaining Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 
UC Berkeley Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 78 (2002), available at 
http://papers.ssm.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=29923. 
143. ENVTL. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME SHOULD NOT PAY: SPOTLIGHT ON BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: SPOTLIGHT 2002, at http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/business/444255/518536/ (last visited Dec. 17,2003). 
144. In the United States, by contrast, environmental agencies have not attempted to qualitatively 
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* Excerpted from British Environmental Agency, Spotlight on Busi-
ness Environment Performance, http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uklbusiness/444255/518536/. 
Notably, the British Environmental Agency reports positive results from 
the program: 
When the Environment Agency first turned the media spotlight on 
poor environmental performance five years ago, a chorus of disap-
proval rose through the ranks of regulated industry. Five years on, 
Spotlight on business environmental performance has developed 
and expanded into a rounded assessment of performance, good and 
bad, and highlights positive action as well as failings. In its short 
lifetime the report has become a regular fixture in the environ-
mental calendar, its findings keenly anticipated by some, anxiously 
awaited by others. The latest report shows the positive trends of 
previous years continuing .... [These trends include] reductions in 
many pollutants and significant overall improvements in environ-
mental management. 145 
145. ENVTL. AGENCY, SPOTLIGHT ON BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 2002, at I, avail-
able at http://www.environment-agency.gov.uklcommondatal105385/spC2002full_523404.pdf. 
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* Excerpted from British Environmental Agency, Spotlight on Business 
Environment Performance, http://www.environment-
agency.gov,uklbusiness/444255/518536/. 
The EPA and the states should follow the lead of Britain's Environ-
mental Agency in its effort to spotlight the performance of regulated facili-
ties. The EPA has taken a very significant step in this direction with the 
development in 2002 of the Enforcement and Compliance History Online 
("ECHO") web site, although, as discussed below, it has stopped short of 
the British agency's efforts. 146 
146. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE HISTORY ONLINE, available al 
hnp:/Iwww.epa.gov/echo/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). 
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ECHO, an outgrowth of a pilot project known the Sector Facility Index-
ing Project ("SFIP"), provides enforcement and compliance information 
under the CW A, the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act ("RCRA") for about 800,000 regulated facilities. 147 While 
much of this information was previously publicly available, it was scattered 
in different places and hard to access. In particular, ECHO displays for the 
previous two years the following information: inspections or evaluations of 
the facility; its compliance status; violations detected; pollutants associated 
with the violations and whether they are significant; formal enforcement 
actions taken; and penalties imposed as a result of the enforcement actions. 
It also provides data about the demographics of the community located 
within one, three, and five miles of the facility. During its first year, the 
EPA reports that the site was accessed by over one million people. 148 
ECHO is not without its critics and flaws. Numerous regulated entities, 
in particular, have made complaints about presentation and searching issues 
(i.e., navigating the site), that some terms are confusing, and about the accu-
racy and completeness of data, including whether corrections are entered 
rapidly enough. 149 They also contend that the data presented is not meaning-
ful to the public without additional context,150 and they fault the EPA for 
providing too much data, arguing, for example, that the "site presents an 
excessive amount of information that is overwhelming to members of the 
general public who are not environmentally sophisticated and trained in 
environmental law jargon.,,151 
On the other hand, as evidenced by the large number of positive com-
ments filed with the EPA after it launched the site, disclosure can be enor-
mously potent. 152 Numerous members of the public commented on the em-
powering function of the site. One wrote that "[t]his is a tremendous re-
source to help us track the actions of potential polluters in our watershed. It 
helps us identify persistent flaunters of environmental laws and, just as im-
portantly, lets us know which industries are doing a good job at managing 
147. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY. ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE HISTORY ONLINE, ABOUT THE 
DATA, at http://www.epa.gov/echo/about_data.html(last visited Jan. 31, 2004). ECHO focuses on in-
formation at Clean Air Act stationary sources, CW A major dischargers, and RCRA hazardous waste 
handlers. Most violations at minor CW A dischargers are not included. [d. 
148. Press Release, Luke C. Hester, EPA, EPA's ECHO Resonates with Public, One Million 
Searches Recorded in First Year of Enforcement/Compliance Web Database (Nov. 19, 2003) at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opaiadmpress.nsflb I ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/e6bf84f19616f3b9852 
56de30055afcd?OpenDocument. 
149. See, e.g., Comments of James W. Conrad, Jr, American Chemistry Council, submitted in re-
sponse to the EPA's request for public comment about pilot ECHO website (Mar. 29, 2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/comments/echo/acc-conrad-cmt.pdf. 
150. See, e.g., Comments of Mark A. Greenwood, Coalition for Effective Environmental informa-
tion, submitted in response to the EPA's request for public comment about pilot ECHO website (Mar. 
31, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliancelresources/comments/echo!ceei-gmwood-
cmt.pdf. 
151. Regulated Entity User, Response to Solicited EPA Question regarding ECHO public database 
(Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/ech030mments_I_23_03.html. 
152. The EPA reported receiving over 10,000 e-mails supporting continuation and enhancement of 
ECHO during its first year. See Press Release, supra note 148. 
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[sic] their pollution.,,153 Another commented that "I really appreciate the 
opportunity to see how well the companies in my community are complying 
with our environmental law.,,154 Others noted how ECHO had directly 
helped inform their decisionmaking: 
As a concerned citizen that is presently seeking to move north of 
my current community, this is an invaluable resource. My family & 
I have already terminated an agreement for a home purchase due to 
the excessive quantities of both lead & arsenic in the home's drink-
ing water. To have access to the various water-treatment facilities' 
statistical information, it will assist countless individuals to make 
the best choices for their loved-ones. 155 
Interestingly, state and local agency staff also noted the value of 
ECHO's information, such as reflected in the following comment: "As a 
state-level staff that handles facility NPDES permit compliance & enforce-
ment, this website would definitely assist me in ensuring that correct and 
up-to-date data is in the federal system for facilities, as well as provide an 
at-a-glance overview of their 24 month compliance status.,,156 Another local 
government user noted that because of ECHO, "I was able to see many, 
many companies in my city and see what they are up to and what danger 
they might pose,,,157 while another reported using ECHO "as a vital compo-
nent of Title V [of the Clean Air Act] reviews [that] helps me understand 
which plants need the most scrutiny.,,158 Even a substantial number of regu-
lated entities praised ECHO, one noting that "[t]his database is revolution-
ary for environmental awareness,'''59 another commenting that "this is a 
great tool to review other operations and their problems so that we can [sic] 
153. Unaffiliated User, Public Comment regarding ECHO public database (Jan. 9, 2003), at 
http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/ech030mments_I_9_03.html. Another wrote: 
Hooray for the EPA and their new Echo Web site. Citizen monitoring is an important element 
in protecting our communities from noxious poisons and other pollution. Easy access to in-
formation about what is going on in our communities is an important democratic principle. 1 
applaud the EPA in providing a useful tool for protecting public health and safety. What we 
don't know truly can hurt us. 
[d. (Dec. 6, 2002), at http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/echo_comments_12_6_02.html. 
154. Unaffiliated User, Public Comment regarding ECHO public database (Nov. 29, 2002), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/echo_comments_II_29_02.html. Another commentator wrote: "I think 
the ability of citizens to access the kind of information is extremely important. Please continue this 
service, which lets community residents take action regarding their health and well being." [d. (Mar. 13, 
2003), at http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/ech030mments_3_13_03.html. 




157. Local Government User, Comment regarding ECHO public database (Mar. 6, 2003), at 
http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/echo_comments_3_6_03.html. 
158. Local Government User, Comment regarding ECHO public database (Dec. 6, 2002), at 
http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/echo_comments_12_6_02.html. 
159. Regulated Entity User, Comment regarding ECHO public database (Mar. 13, 2003), at 
http://www.epa.gov/echo/info/echo_comments_3_13_03.html. 
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pro-active instead of re-active.,,16o The EPA found in its review of public 
comments that "industry reported that companies were finding ECHO to be 
an efficient and cost-saving way to monitor the compliance records of their 
facilities scattered around the country.,,161 
ECHO is very impressive as far as it goes, but it stops short of the full 
potential that can be achieved by spotlighting. While EPA has amassed a 
great deal of data in one place, it has not taken the next step of publicly 
evaluating and ranking the compliance records and performance of regu-
lated firms. Spotlighting is at its most powerful and effective when it draws 
clear distinctions among firms. As Professor Shelley Metzenbaum has writ-
ten, comparison has great power to embarrass and motivate, just as the spot-
light of comparison shopping by consumers spurs firms to improve their 
products. 162 Thus, the EPA (and eventually states as well, when they de-
velop adequate capacity) should take the next step and begin publicly evalu-
ating and comparing the compliance records of the best and worst regulated 
facilities. It should rank facilities based on factors such as number of viola-
tions, size of penalties assessed against them, length of time in significant 
noncompliance, frequency of repeat violations, degree to which discharges 
or emissions exceed permitted levels, absolute levels of excess emissions or 
discharges, and number of spills or accidental releases. These comparisons 
should be done both in tabular and graphic form so that they are visually 
compelling.163 The EPA should begin with a few key priority sectors, as it 
did with the pilot SFIP that paved the way for ECHO. I64 While this type of 
analysis could in theory be performed by environmental organizations, it 
would involve considerable resources and, more importantly, lack the credi-
bility and objectivity of a report generated by the government. 
160. Regulated Entity User, Comment regarding ECHO public database (Dec. 12, 2002), at 
http://www .epa.gov/echo/info/echo_comments_12_12_02.html. 
161. Press Release, supra note 148. 
162. Shelley Metzenbaum, Making Measurement Work: The Challenges and Promise of Building a 
Performance-Focused Environmental Protection System 42 (Oct. 1998), at 
http://www.brook.eduldybdocrootlgslcprnlmetzenbaum.pdf. 
163. See Shelley H. Metzenbaum & Tiffin Shewmake, Realizing the Value of the Permit Compliance 
System Upgrade. Environmental Compliance Consortium 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.complianceconsortium.orglECCArticles/Comments.asp (arguing that agencies should gener-
ate and post graphs showing the top 20% of facilities with the greatest noncompliance or the facilities 
that exceeded their permit limits more than 20% of the time). Metzenbaum and Shewmake also suggest 
that agencies should routinely generate and post graphs showing a facility's discharge/emission trends in 
relation to its permit level, graphs that "make it easy to see which facilities have the most significant or 
enduring problems." Shelley H. Metzenbaum & Tiffin Shewmake, More Nutritious Beans, ENVTL. F., at 
18,31 (Mar.-Apr. 2003). available at 
http://www.complianceconsortium.orglECCAuthoredIMoreNutritiousBeans.pdf. 
164. The SFIP focused on five industrial sectors: petroleum refining; iron and steel production; 
primary nonferrous metals smelting and refining; pulp manufacturing; auto assembly. as well as some 
major federal facilities. See http://www.epa.gov/sfipmtnl/intro_and_overview.html. 
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B. EPA Spotlight on State Agency Performance 
The public spotlight on environmental enforcement and compliance ef-
forts should go beyond individual facilities. As discussed above, the EPA's 
traditional approaches for overseeing state programs have not been particu-
larly effective. Thus, to promote better state performance, the EPA should 
evaluate and rank, and publicly disclose, how well state environmental 
agencies are performing-issue regular "report cards" on state performance. 
There are several types of criteria that can be used to evaluate state en-
vironmental programs, including bottom-line environmental indicators or 
conditions, rates of compliance and other behavioral changes by regulated 
entities, and levels of agency enforcement activities (e.g., number of inspec-
tions carried out, enforcement actions initiated, penalties assessed, etc.), and 
a growing literature about the merits of these approaches. 165 While it is be-
yond the scope of this Article to discuss all of these strategies, levels of 
compliance should be very significant in judging the efficacy of enforce-
ment programs. Although not without important limits,166 compliance is a 
"bottom line" measure for state enforcement programs-reflecting the suc-
cess of states in ensuring that regulated facilities adhere to the law. 
The EPA's traditional guidance for oversight of state enforcement pro-
grams,167 as well as more recent guidance developed under the National 
Environmental Performance Partnership System ("NEPPS"), a new 
EP Nstate oversight initiative, identifies rates of compliance as one criterion 
for evaluating state program performance. 168 But historically, compliance 
rates have not played a central role in the EPA's evaluation of state pro-
grams, and many states have not measured them in a reliable manner. 169 
There are any number of reasons for this, including the technical challenges 
and resources involved in calculating accurate compliance rates. 170 If, how-
165. For a discussion of these issues, see RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 77, at 296-312. 
166. /d. Compliance rates do not tel1 the ful1 story about the efficacy of a state's environmental 
program. If a state's underlying permit requirements are weak or outdated, for instance (and recent 
studies indicate that a distressingly high number of CW A permits are outdated), a high rate of compli-
ance may not be particularly meaningful or informative about the condition of the state's environment. 
167. Memorandum from James Barnes, Deputy Administrator to Assistant Administrator, et aI., 
Revised Policy Framework for State/EPA Enforcement Agreements (Aug. 25, 1986), available at 
hup:/Iwww.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/planning/state/enforce-agree-mem.pdf. 
168. In 1995, the EPA and the states created a new, ostensibly more flexible framework to govern 
federal/state relations, the National Environmental Performance Partnership System ("NEPPS"). See 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, JOINT COMMITMENT TO REFORM OVERSIGHT AND CREATE A NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM, available at 
hup:/Iwww.epa.gov/ocirpage/neppslovrsight.htm (last visited on May 10, 2002). As part of that frame-
work, the EPA and the state agreed to a set of "core accountability measures" for evaluating state en-
forcement and compliance activities, which include rates of compliance. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
OFFICE OF STATE & LocAL RELATIONS, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE, FY 2000 
ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES FOR ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, available at 
hUp:/Iwww.epa.gov/ocir/neppsienflist.html. 
169. See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 77, at 187 (noting that eighteen states were 
unable to provide any data on significant noncompliance with environmental laws to ECOS in its 2001 
survey). 
170. [d. at 302-04. 
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ever, states' authorization to implement federal programs or their access to 
federal funding were contingent on providing accurate and complete com-
pliance information, the states would be spurred to calculate more reliable 
compliance rates. 
Thus, the EPA should insist as a condition of granting NPDES program 
authorization to the states that states (1) develop a methodology for accu-
rately measuring compliance rates, (2) annually calculate such rates, and (3) 
publicly report them. Some key compliance measures that should be re-
ported include the overall rate of compliance and significant noncompliance 
among regulated facilities, the rate of compliance and significant noncom-
pliance in priority sectors, the severity of noncompliance (i.e., how far in 
excess of permitted levels are unlawful discharges), and rates of repeat and 
recidivist violations. 
The EPA should compile the information reported by states and present 
in comparative form the compliance rates achieved within each state, per-
haps grouping states by region of the country. This data should be posted on 
the EPA's regional and national web pages, among other places, and other-
wise widely disseminated to the public and media. As argued above, disclo-
sure and comparison have great power to embarrass and motivate better 
performance. 171 
C. Expanding Securities Rules Governing Corporate Disclosure 
of Enforcement Information 
In addition to the spotlighting approaches outlined above, the stock 
market also can create strong incentives for firms to improve environmental 
compliance as investors increasingly look to environmental performance as 
a relevant investment criterion. 
There is an expanding socially responsible investment movement that 
evaluates the social records of companies, including their record of envi-
ronmental compliance and performance, when making investment decisions 
in the stock market. Approximately $2.16 trillion of professionally managed 
assets in the United States is invested according to social criteria-
approximately 11 % of all such assets. This number has been steadily grow-
ing over the past decade. 172 A Gallup poll in 2000 found that 9% of the pub-
171. For the reasons discussed above, there also should be a bigger spotlight on the EPA's own 
enforcement record, including its success in achieving compliance with CW A permit requirements. The 
performance record of EPA regional offices should be compared to other regional offices, as well as to 
that of the states. Notably, the EPA has been working over the past few years to improve its methodol-
ogy for measuring compliance rates and otherwise measure the bottom line success of its enforcement 
program. See id. at 182-83. 
172. Soc. INv. FORUM, 2003 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, at i-ii (Dec. 2(03), available at 
http://www.socialinvest.orglareas/researchltrends/sri_trends_reporc2003.pdf. According to the Social 
Investment Forum, assets in socially-screened portfolios increased by 7% from 200 I to 2003, while 
assets in all professionally managed portfolios fell 4%. ld. 
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lic had bought or sold stocks based on the environmental record of the com-
panies in the previous year. 173 
Beyond this socially responsible segment of the market, information 
about environmental performance can be quite relevant to other investors. A 
number of studies show that stock prices rise and fall in response to the re-
lease of either positive or negative environmental information about firms' 
performances. 174 Events that have been shown to trigger significant reduc-
tions in the market value of firms include disclosures relating to the compli-
ance record of firms, such as the initiation of enforcement actions against a 
company, or oil or chemical spills, as well as such as disclosures of high 
levels of routine emissions. For example, a study of stock market reactions 
to 730 EPA judicial actions for a sample of publicly-traded firms from 1972 
to 1991 found that the market value of the average affected firm dropped 
0.43% during the week of settlement of the enforcement action. The esti-
mated market penalty was larger for more recent actions and for repeat of-
fenders. 175 Another recent investigation looked at the impact on stock prices 
of firms in three industrial sectors in India after a leading environmental 
group published ratings about their environmental performance, which gen-
erally showed poor performance. It found that in two of the three sectors 
examined, stock prices declined significantly after the ratings were pub-
lished. The losses were more significant for firms with lower rankings; de-
clines were as high as 43% for those identified as the worst performers. 176 
Similarly, another study found that the public announcement of penalties by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") led to a sig-
nificant drop in stock prices. 177 There are numerous reasons why the disclo-
sure of noncompliance or poor environmental performance may lead to 
stock losses. Investors may view it is a signal that the firm is more likely to 
face future enforcement actions, compliance and remedial costs, third-party 
173. See GUBER, supra note 36, at 50. 
174. Paul Lanoie et aI., Can Capital Markets Create Incentives for Pollution Control?, 26 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. I, 35-36 (1998) (providing a discussion of various studies that reach this conclu-
sion). For example, Professor James Hamilton found that firms suffered statistically significant negative 
stock returns of between 0.2% and 0.3%, an average loss per firm of $4.1 million in stock value, when 
TRI data was first disclosed in 1989. James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market 
Reactions 10 the Toxics Release Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98, 109 (1995). A later study 
looking at chemical firms reported similar results following disclosure of TRI data in the years 1990 to 
1994. Firms with more releases had more negative returns. Madhu Khanna et aI., Toxic Release Informa-
tion: A Policy Toolfor Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 244 (1998). 
175. S.G. Bandrinath & PJ. Bolster, The Role of Market Forces in EPA Enforcement Activity, 10 J. 
REG. ECON. 165, 167 (1996). 
176. Shreekant Gupta & Bishwanath Goldar, Do Stock Markets Penalise Environment-Unfriendly 
Behaviour? Evidence from India, Center for Development Economics Working Paper No. 116, at 16 
(Mar. 2003) (copy on file with author). 
177. Wallace N. Davidson ill et aI., The Effectiveness of OSHA Penalties: A Stock-Market Based 
Test, 33 INOUST. REL. 283 (1994). The size of the market decline, however, did not depend on the size of 
the penalties imposed. Other researchers found in a study of developing countries that stock values rise 
when positive environmental performance is publicized by the government and fall in response to citizen 
complaints about firms. Susmita Dasgupta et aI., Capital Market Responses to Environmental Perform-
ance in Developing Countries, The World Bank, Working Paper #1909 (1998), available at 
http://www.worldbank.orglnipr/work_paperlindex.htm. 
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litigation, or loss of future governmental contracts. Likewise, they may 
think that the firm will be perceived by government regulators and the pub-
lic as a bad actor, making it more difficult for the company to obtain permits 
and regulatory approvals, subject to more enforcement scrutiny, or likely to 
face more community opposition. Or investors may regard this data as an 
indication that the firm is poorly managed or operating inefficiently. 
At the same time, there is a growing body of evidence demonstrating 
that firms with superior environmental records perform better financially 
than their counterparts with weaker records-that environmental perform-
ance can serve as a partial proxy for the risk of investing in a firm. In a re-
view of the literature in 2000, the EPA concluded that "[a] significant body 
of research shows a moderate positive correlation between a firm's envi-
ronmental performance and its financial performance, regardless of the 
variables used to represent each kind of performance, the technique used to 
analyze the relationship, or the date of the study,',\78 In their study of 652 
manufacturing firms, for example, Professors Andrew King and Michael 
Lenox found that firms that had lower levels of emissions (both in an abso-
lute sense and relative to other firms in their industry) had higher levels of 
financial performance.179 Another recent analysis looked at the performance 
of close to 200 firms and found a positive relationship between environ-
mental and economic performance, as measured by annual industry-adjusted 
stock returns. (The study also found that superior environmental performers 
disclose more pollution-related environmental information than do poor 
performers l80 and that there was a positive relationship between past disclo-
sure and current performance. 181 ) Innovest, a financial advisory firm, has 
developed investment risk ratings for 1500 corporations based on their envi-
ronmental performance and viability. According to its grading system, in-
vesting in firms with high environmental ratings will yield returns from 1.5 
to 3 points higher than investing in firms across the stock market. 182 
178. ENVTL. CAPITAL MARKETS COMM., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GREEN DIVIDENDS? THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRMS' ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(May 2(00), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocemlnaceptlgreen_dividends.pdf. 
179. Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Does it Really Pay to Be Green? An Empirical Study of 
Firm Environmental and Financial Peiformance, 5 J. INDUS. ECOL. 105, 110-11 (2001). The3uthors 
cautioned that they could not conclude what caused the higher financial returns-whether it was because 
more profitable firms invest more in environmental performance or because better environmental per-
formance leads to greater profits. 
180. Sulaiman A. AI-Tuwaijri et aI., The Relations Among Environmental Disclosure, Environmental 
Peiformance, and Economic Peiformance: A Simultaneous Equations Approach 3 (2003), available at 
http://ssrn.comlabstract=405643. The authors measured disclosure based on information reported in SEC 
Forms IO-K relating to oil and chemical spills, penalties, toxic waste generated and transferred or recy-
cled, and designation as a responsible party for cleanup of hazardous waste sites.,. 
181. Id. at 24-25. The authors posit that prior disclosure establishes a lower bound for performance 
that if breached might challenge the expectations of investors. 
182. Innovest has also found that the financial performance of the top rated chemical companies is 
16% higher than those in the bottom half. See William Greider, The Greening of American Capitalism, 
25 ONEARTH 20, 22 (Fall 2003). Likewise, a study by the Alliance for Environmental Innovation con-
cluded that superior performing environmental firms outperformed their peers on the stock market by as 
much as two percent. See Claudia Deutsch, Investing it: For Wall Street, Increasing Evidence that Green 
Begets Green, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 3-7. 
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Thus, environmental performance information is important to both so-
cially responsible and ordinary investors. Notably, a national survey of in-
vestors in 2000 found that 79% of respondents believed that information 
about corporate responsibility, including compliance with environmental 
standards, was necessary to make investment decisions. 183 As discussed 
below, this interest can and should be leveraged to encourage better envi-
ronmental compliance by publicly-traded firms by requiring greater disclo-
sure of environmental compliance-related information. l84 
Currently, securities law requires that publicly-traded firms disclose a 
range of information when companies first issue securities and on a regular 
basis thereafter. The disclosure requirements are contained in one omnibus 
regulation issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), 
Regulation S_K. 185 Unfortunately, the current rules bearing most directly on 
disclosures about environmental enforcement and compliance related issues 
are unduly narrow. Item 103 requires companies to disclose any material 
environmental, legal, or administrative proceedings, either pending or 
known to be contemplated, including actions involving the government 
which involve potential monetary sanctions that are likely to exceed 
$100,000, and any claims for damages or sanctions that exceed 10% of the 
company's assets. 186 Firms are also required by Item 101 to make "appro-
priate disclosure" about the material effects that complying with environ-
mental requirements may have upon the firm's capital expenditures, earn-
ings, and competitive position.187 Item 303 also requires firms to disclose 
any known trends or uncertainties that the company reasonably expects will 
have a material impact on the company, which can include potential en-
183. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. Acer., FINDINGS OF NATIONAL INVESTOR POLL ON AUDITING 
AND FINANCIAL REPORTING (2000), at http://www.aicpa.org/auditor_independence/report.htm. quoted in 
Michelle Chan-Fischel, After Enron: How Accounting and SEC Reform Can Promote Corporate Ac-
countability While Restoring Public Confidence, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,965, 10,968, n.37 (2002); see 
also id. at 10,969 ("Many [Socially Responsible Investors] monitor companies' social and environmental 
performance with the belief that good management of environmental or 'soft' issues is a proxy of good 
overall management capacity, which is a driver of financial out- performance"), and 10,975 (noting that 
large institutional investors use nonfinancial data as a basis of up to 35% of their asset allocation deci-
sions). 
184. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the extent to which broader environmental 
disclosures, such as a firm's use and generation of toxic chemicals, use of recycled materials, the effects 
that their activities may have on the environment, etc., should be required. 
185. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.702. 
186. [d. § 229.103. Companies must disclose the court or agency where the proceedings are pending, 
the date instituted, the principal parties involved, a description of the alleged facts, and the relief sought. 
For government enforcement actions, a company must disclose any proceeding unless it "reasonably 
believes" that such proceeding will result in no sanctions or sanctions less than $100,000. See id., In-
struction 5(C). For claims for damages or sanctions in excess of 10% of current assets, multiple actions 
that present in large degree the same factual and legal issues should be considered together. [d., Instruc-
tion 2. The Supreme Court has ruled that information is material if there is a "substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the investor as having significantly altered 
the 'total mix' of information." See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
187. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10I(c)(I)(xii). This would include the costs of installing pollution control 
equipment, cleanup costs under CERCLA or other statutes, and other costs of noncompliance. See John 
W. Bagby et aI., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate liability and Environmental Disclo-
sure, 14 V A. ENVTL. LJ. 225,289-90 (1995). 
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forcement actions or future regulatory compliance costs. 188 The rules do not, 
however, mandate disclosure of other information about a firm's environ-
mental compliance record that may be equally relevant to investors. 
The SEC should expand Item 103 in three ways. First, it should include 
in the category of legal proceedings with sanctions likely to exceed 
$100,000 citizen-initiated enforcement actions, as well as government pro-
ceedings. 189 (Under current rules, citizen actions for penalties that exceed 
10% of a company's assets would have to be disclosed, but in many in-
stances this is a much higher threshold.) As Professor Jim May has docu-
mented, citizen actions to enforce the CW A have grown dramatically in size 
and significance over the past two decades; between 1995 and 2003, for 
example, citizen enforcers filed 1428 sixty-day notices of intent to sue un-
der the CW A. 190 Second, any criminal enforcement action for violation of 
environmental laws should be considered "per se" material and subject to 
disclosure, regardless of the amount. Criminal actions may not lead to sig-
nificant monetary sanctions but may reflect far more serious and deep-
seated corporate misbehavior than civil actions over $100,000. Third, "sanc-
tion" should be interpreted to include not merely penalties but remedial 
clean-up costs, environmentally beneficial projects, and other expenditures 
that result from government actions. (Under current rules, these costs have 
to be disclosed if they exceed the 10% threshold of a company's assets.) For 
investors seeking to evaluate the environmental performance of a company, 
information about such expenditures may be as consequential as sanctions 
prompted by enforcement actions. 
Beyond amending Item 103 to reflect the above changes, there are lar-
ger questions of what enforcement-related data should be subject to manda-
tory disclosure given the heightened investor interest in environmental per-
formance. Reformers have persuasively argued for the adoption of broader 
disclosure rules that go well beyond current requirements. These include 
requiring firms to disclose the total number of private and government en-
forcement actions filed against the firm; the total value of penalties, Sup-
plemental Environmental Projects ("SEPs") and other payments assessed 
against the firm or paid pursuant to civil settlements; and summaries of 
compliance and monitoring reports that firms are required to prepare under 
various environmental statutes. 191 Some major institutional investors, in-
188. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). The rule also requires disclosure of any "unusual events" that 
materially affect a company's income.ld. § 229.303(a)(3)(i). 
189. I thank Golden Gate University LLM student Terra Pfund for bringing this suggestion to my 
attention in a paper on this topic. See Terra Pfund, Corporate Environmental Accountability: Expanding 
SEC Disclosures to Promote Market-Based Environmentalism (on file with author). 
190. James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,704,10,712 (2003). 
191. See Chan-Fischel, supra note 183, at 10,977 (quoting Corporate Sunshine Working Group 
recommendations); Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1300-02 (1999). Some firms may fail to disclose liabilities 
because of uncertainty about how to estimate environmental liabilities and potential risks. As a recent 
report by the Rose Foundation for Communities and the Environment argues, to address this problem, 
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cluding state treasurers, have also begun calling for the SEC to broaden its 
d· I . 192 ISC osure reqUirements. 
In the past, the SEC has resisted efforts to mandate disclosure of this 
type of information on the grounds that it was not material to investors. As 
discussed above and as articulated by Michelle Chan-Fischel, "the same 
argument clearly cannot be justified today ... [B]oth traditional and socially 
responsible investors seek and incorporate nonfinancial information as an 
essential part of their investment analysis and decisionmaking.,,193 Indeed, 
the bottom line "[e]vidence that information about compliance with the law 
is material is found in the typical stock market reaction to a company's an-
nouncement of illegality: the stock price drops.,,194 
One final but critical point is that no matter what rules are in place, they 
will have little impact if they are not followed. Even the limited disclosures 
currently required by SEC rules seem to be ignored by most companies, as 
documented saliently by a 1998 EPA investigation. The study looked at 
disclosure in firms' lO-K statements of legal proceedings involving three 
types of monetary sanctions in excess of $100,000: (1) penalties, (2) SEPs, 
the SEC should adopt voluntary industry guidelines for estimating environmental liabilities that have 
been developed by the American Society for Testing and Materials International ("ASTM"). The guide-
lines set forth standard methodologies and also require disclosure when cumulative environmental li-
abilities, penalties, settlements, fines, and violations exceed regulatory thresholds. The report notes that 
the guidelines would "help to close one of the biggest loopholes in environmental reporting today-
piecemeal accounting of environmentalliabilities-[andl to show companies how they can estimate and 
report environmental liabilities despite uncertainty." THE ROSE FOUND. FOR CMTYS. & THE ENV'T, THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL FIDUCIARY: THE CASE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS INTO 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT POLICIES 56 (2002). 
192. See Statement of Denise L. Nappier, Connecticut State Treasurer, Congressional Symposium, 
Securities and Exchange Commission Social and Environmental Disclosure: Meeting the Information 
Needs of Today's Investors (July 10, 2003) (urging the SEC to create a Blue Ribbon Task Force to 
formally review its existing disclosure rules and enforcement policies related to social and environ-
mental issues and recommend changes to ensure that shareholders receive the information necessary to 
make informed investment decisions) [hereinafter Nappier Statementl, available at 
http://www.corporatesunshine.orglsympresstate.pdf; see also Letter from Jill Ratner, President, Rose 
Foundation for Communities and the Environment, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (noting support of California Treasurer and New York City Controller for Rose 
Foundation petition urging SEC to adopt ASTM guidelines for estimating environmental liabilities), 
available at http://www.corporatesunshine.orglsympall.pdf. 
193. Chan-Fischel, supra note 183, at 10,975. In rulemaking proceedings in the mid 1970s, the SEC 
rejected various proposals to broaden required environmental disclosures, including disclosure of non-
compliance with environmental regulations and disclosure of all environmental litigation. Bagby et aI., 
supra note 187, at 276-78. The SEC argued, in part, that its discretion to regulate disclosures was limited 
to information that bears on the economic value of investments. Id; Williams, supra note 191, at 1263-
69. Professor Williams has argued that in light of the rapidly expanding social investment movement, a 
significant portion of investors would find information of this type material. She additionally argues that 
even if that were not true, the social goals underlying the federal securities acts empower the SEC to 
require disclosure of matters that do not bear directly on the economic value of an investment. The 
underlying goals of the acts include providing investors with full and fair information necessary to make 
informed investment decisions and to cast well-informed votes about management, and to pressure 
management to adopt new strategies. Professor Williams argues that each of these goals is advanced by 
providing investors with a full range of important information on the way companies are being managed, 
including what environmental practices are being followed that may have negative ramifications in the 
future or be of ethical concern. Id. at 1265-68, 1272. See also Chan-Fischel, supra note 183, at 10,974-
77 (refuting arguments against expanded disclosure). 
194. See Williams, supra note 191, at 1278-79. 
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and (3) corrective actions under the RCRA. 195 Over a two-year period, non-
disclosure rates were high: 74% for proceedings involving penalties; 84 % 
for proceedings involving SEPs; and 96% for RCRA corrective actions. 
Even fewer companies accurately disclosed the required information (i.e., 
correctly identified the statute violated and the amount of the sanction). 196 In 
another study of twenty-six firms involved in initial public offerings who 
were known potentially responsible parties under the federal Superfund law, 
only twelve made any sort of disclosure about potential environmental li-
abilities, and even among those firms, the information disclosed was quite 
limited. The authors chose to examine this group because of the heightened 
scrutiny surrounding firms when they first go public. They concluded: 
[T]he empirical evidence is unequivocal: the same relatively low 
level of disclosure by companies already admitted to the public se-
curities markets is mimicked by those firms that are "going public" 
for the first time. The more intense scrutiny, the higher stakes in-
volved in an [Initial Public Offering] and the enhanced due dili-
gence procedures apparently are of no consequence in prompting a 
greater amount or quality of environmental disclosure.197 
Complaints filed with the SEC and investor lawsuits have alleged that in 
numerous other instances, companies have failed to disclose material envi-
ronmental matters, including government enforcement actions. 198 
Thus, it is essential for the SEC to more vigorously police its disclosure 
rules with respect to environmental enforcement and compliance matters, to 
systematically screen public filings by firms to ensure that they disclose 
environmental matters, and even more importantly, to take enforcement 
action against violators. 199 The SEC appears to acknowledge to at least 
195. Form 10-K statements refer to annual reports that publicly-traded companies are required to file. 
196. The study found that firms correctly disclosed the required information in only 16% of proceed-
ings involving penalties, 4% of cases involving SEPS, and I % of RCRA corrective actions. Nicholas 
Franco, Corporate Environmental Disclosure: Opportunities to Harness Market Forces to Improve Cor-
porate Environmental Performance, American Bar Association Section on Environment, Energy, and 
Resources, Conference on Environmental Law, Keystone, Colorado (Mar. 8-11, 2001), available at 
http://www.corporatesunshine.orglepaaba.pdf. 
197. MARTIN FREEDMAN & AJ. STAGLIANO, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF COMPANIES 
INVOLVED IN INITIAL PuBLIC OFFERINGS 19 (1996), available at 
http://panopticon.csustan.edu/cpa96/papers.htmlfreedrnan.htm. (last visited Dec. 19,2003). See also 
ROBERT REPETTO & D. AUSTIN, COMING CLEAN: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIALLY 
SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 13, 23-24 (2000) (study of thirteen pulp and paper companies 
found that most failed to disclose or adequately discuss the impacts of known pending environmental 
issues, although many did report prospective Superfund liabilities). 
198. These are discussed in Chan-Fischel, supra note 183, at 10,971-73. See also Nappier Statement, 
supra note 192 ("[W)e find that many companies either fail to report material information or underreport 
information important to shareholders.") The General Accounting Office is currently preparing a report 
that examines corporate compliance with the SEC's environmental disclosure requirements. See Pro-
posed Agenda & Background Materials, Congressional Symposium, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Social and Environmental Disclosure: Meeting the Information Needs of Today's Investors (July 
10, 2003), available at http://www.corporatesunshine.org.lsympagenda.pdf. 
199. See Nappier Statement, supra note 192 ("[T)he SEC should adopt clear and definite conse-
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some degree that environmental disclosure is an issue worthy of closer at-
tention. It indicated in 2001 that it would devote more resources to this is-
sue,200 and in comments issued on the annual reports of Fortune 500 com-
panies filed in 2002, the SEC reported that a number of companies had not 
adequately disclosed their environmental liabilities and that the SEC had 
asked them to enhance their disclosures.201 
Nonetheless, the agency almost never brings enforcement actions 
against firms based on failure to disclose environmentally-related informa-
tion. According to a study by Robert Repetto and Duncan Austin of the 
World Resources Institute, out of over 5000 administrative enforcement 
actions initiated by the SEC from 1975 to 2000, only three were based on 
inadequate disclosure of environmental risks or liabilities.z02 Over the same 
period, the SEC brought only one civil enforcement case for insufficient 
environmental disclosure rules. Three of these four actions were brought 
before 1980.203 Repetto and Austin conclude that "[s]uch a small number of 
enforcement actions does not suggest vigorous enforcement activity ... 
[e]xamples of incomplete disclosure brought to the SEC's attention have not 
resulted in any discernible enforcement action.,,204 As one EPA enforcement 
lawyer remarked, "the SEC's non-enforcement ... undermines EPA opera-
tions to encourage corporate compliance with U.S. environmental laws ... 
it sets a disincentive for others to comply if competitors aren't.,,205 
For its part, the EPA should be more proactive in trying to encourage 
SEC vigilance and firm compliance with disclosure rules. The agency has 
expressed its view that "[i]ncreased scrutiny of corporate environmental 
information, particularly legal proceedings, by the public, shareholders, and 
investors will likely provide an incentive for companies to handle environ-
mental problems in a more expeditious manner, and provide a deterrent to 
future noncompliance.,,206 In early 2001, the EPA began notifying parties 
quences for incomplete or inaccurate compliance with its disclosure rules, regardless of the stringency of 
the requirements .... While I believe that strengthened reporting is necessary, at a minimum the SEC 
must take steps to ensure that current reporting requirements are met."). 
200. See Chan-Fischel, supra note 183, at 10,973 (noting that in 200 I, SEC representatives an-
nounced that the SEC would begin screening company 10-K filings for compliance with a number of 
different criteria, including environmental disclosure, and that the SEC had created a dedicated telephone 
helpline to assist firms to properly report environmental issues). 
201. See SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, SUMMARY BY THE DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE OF 
SIGNIFICANT ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE REVIEW OF THE PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE FORTUNE 500 
COMPANIES, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisionslcorpfinlfortune500rep.htm. The SEC indicated 
that it had issued comments about inadequate disclosure of environmental liabilities to a number of oil 
and gas and mining companies, as well as to several manufacturing companies. [d. 
202. See REPETTO & AUSTIN, supra note 197, at II. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. 
205. Donald Sutherland, Beyond Enron: The Next Scandal, 17 EARTH ISLAND 1.21 (Summer 2(02) 
(quoting Shirin Venus, attorney with EPA's Office of Planning, Policy Analysis and Communications). 
206. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE & ASSURANCE, GUIDANCE ON 
DISTRIBUTING THE "NOTICE OF SEC REGISTRANTS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL 
PROCEEDINGS" IN EPA ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (Jan. 19, 2(01), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policieslincentivesIprograms/sec-guid-
distributionofnotice.pdf#page=6 (last visited Dec. 17,2(03). 
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subject to EPA-initiated administrative enforcement actions of their poten-
tial duty to disclose the proceeding in accordance with SEC rules.z07 But the 
EPA does not regularly provide information to the SEC about its enforce-
ment actions208 Nor does the EPA follow up with the SEC to see if firms 
subject to enforcement actions have complied with the SEC's disclosure 
rules. Indeed, after a period of considerable interest and activity in this area 
in the late 1990s,209 the EPA has done relatively little since then to promote 
greater corporate disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Three decades of experience under the CW A have demonstrated both 
the CWA's strengths and deficiencies. One important shortcoming is the 
persistently high level of noncompliance among regulated entities, with 
rates of significant noncompliance around 25%. In an era of scarce re-
sources and growing program needs, new cost-effective approaches to im-
proving compliance are needed. Spotlighting-the mandatory disclosure of 
enforcement and compliance-related data by regulated entities and envi-
ronmental agencies-is one such approach. Although spotlighting has 
grown in popularity over the past two decades as a means to achieve envi-
ronmental goals, it has yet to be fully exploited in the enforcement context. 
As described in this Article, spotlighting strategies, in conjunction with 
other enforcement tools, have the potential to significantly enhance en-
forcement programs and improve compliance with the CW A's require-
ments. It is time for these strategies to be moved to center stage in the effort 
to meet the statute's ambitious objectives. 
207. /d.; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFRCE OF COMPLIANCE & ASSURANCE, ENFORCEMENT 
ALERT, U.S. EPA NOTIFYING DEFENDANTS OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (Oct. 2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/newsietters/civiVenfalertl2001eds.htm!. 
208. According to one EPA enforcement attorney, EPA shares information about enforcement pro-
ceedings with the SEC "from time to time, as appropriate." Telephone Interview with Fran Jonesi, Office 
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (Dec. 12, 2003). 
209. This is reflected, among other things, in the Green Dividends report that EPA commissioned, 
see supra note 178; the EPA investigation of compliance by firms subject to enforcement actions with 
the SEC's disclosure rules, see supra note 196; and the EPA policy of notifying firms subject to en-
forcement actions of their potential disclosure obligations under SEC rules, see supra note 207 206. 
